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ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN THE UNITED NATIONS
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
Vera Shikhelman

Introduction
The idea that certain universal human rights exist arose by the 18th cen1
tury, or even earlier by some accounts. However, individuals’ ability to access international institutions in order to demand the implementation of
those rights was far from obvious, and human rights have traditionally been
2
considered part of the internal affairs of a state. Granting individuals access
to international institutions in order to file complaints against their own
states was seen as a major development in international human rights law
3
after World War II. Although there is probably no customary international
4
right of individuals to access international institutions, some international
and regional human rights treaties have granted individuals standing before
international institutions. The first permanent supranational institution in
which individuals could file communications against their countries was the
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1.
Dan Edelstein, Enlightenment Rights Talk, 86 J. MOD. HIST. 530 (2014) (discussing
the contribution of 18th century philosophers to the development of the idea of natural rights
and human rights).
2.
Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty,” 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
31, 39 (1995) (discussing how the concept of state sovereignty has changed because of the
horrors of World War II); see also KATE PARLETT, THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEM: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 65–83 (James Crawford
et al. eds., 2011) (arguing that, even prior to 1945, there were certain ad hoc arrangements for
individuals to access international institutions to bring claims against states which were not
their states of nationality).
3.
PARLETT, supra note 2, at 3, 27.
4.
Francesco Francioni, The Rights of Access to Justice under Customary International Law, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE AS A HUMAN RIGHT 1, 8 (Francesco Francioni ed., 2007) (arguing that there is no customary international norm granting individuals universal standing
before international institutions).
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5

European Commission of Human Rights, established in 1954. Currently,
there are more than 20 international courts in which individuals have stand6
ing, and even more quasi-judicial bodies.
Even though, with time, there seems to be an increase in the number of
international institutions granting individuals a right to access, there is a serious gap in the empirical literature about the actual usage of this right. For
instance, there is almost no empirical research on questions such as who the
main beneficiaries of the right are in practice, what the main difficulties individuals face in accessing international justice are, and what can be done in
order to make international institutions more accessible to people from all
7
over the world.

5.
Patrick Keyzer et al., What is ‘Access to International Justice’ and What Does it
Require?, in ACCESS TO INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1, 3 (Patrick Keyzer, Vesselin Popovski &
Charles Sampford eds., 2015). Following the establishment of the European Commission, the
European Court of Human Rights was established in 1959. However, individuals were only
granted direct access to it in 1998. Following the model of the European regional system, the
American and African regions also established regional human rights systems. The InterAmerican region established the Human Rights Commission in 1959 and a Court in 1979, and
the African region established a Commission in 1987 and a Court in 1998. In the InterAmerican Court, individuals still have standing only via the Commission, and in the African
Court, individuals have standing only if states explicitly agree.
6.
Karen J. Alter, Private Litigants and the New International Courts, 39 COMP. POL.
STUD. 22, 43 (2006).
7.
Contrary to the international legal system, there is a wide literature on the subject of
access to justice in national jurisdictions. See, e.g., Laura K. Abel, A Right to Counsel in Civil
Cases: Lessons From Gideon v. Wainwright, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 527 (2005)
(discussing how the vast majority of low-income people in the United States are not able to
exercise their right to a meaningful day in court); James E. Cabral et al., Using Technology to
Enhance Access to Justice, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 243 (2012) (assessing how technology
improved access to justice in the United States); Mauro Cappelletti, Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes Within the Framework of the World-Wide Access-to-Justice Movement, 56
MOD. L. REV. 282 (1993) (discussing alternative dispute resolution as a channel of accessing
justice); Brian Etherington, Promises, Promises: Notes on Diversity and Access to Justice, 26
QUEEN’S L.J. 43 (2000) (arguing that channeling litigation toward alternative dispute resolution mechanisms has in fact decreased the access to justice of diversity groups in Canada. For
literature on access to justice in jurisdictions other than the United States and Canada, see
Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the Worldwide
Movement to Make Rights Effective, 27 BUFF. L. REV. 181 (1977) (discussing the emergence
of the concept of “access to justice” and how it is interpreted in different jurisdictions); Matthieu Chemin, The Impact of the Judiciary on Entrepreneurship: Evaluation of Pakistan’s
“Access to Justice Programme,” 93 J. PUB. ECON. 114 (2007) (evaluating how access to justice increased in Pakistan following a reform in the judicial system); Marc Galanter & Jayanth
K. Krishnan, “Bread for the Poor”: Access to Justice and the Rights of the Needy in India, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 789 (2004) (discussing access to justice of the poor in India); Patricia Hughes,
Law Commissions and Access to Justice: What Justice Should We Be Talking About?, 46
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 773 (2008) (arguing that, in the Canadian context, law commissions
should have a wider perspective of the “access to justice” idea and incorporate into their work
insights of other disciplines and the experience of diverse communities); Earl Johnson, Jr.,
Equal Access to Justice: Comparing Access to Justice in the United States and Other Industrial Democracies, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. S83 (2000) (conducting comparative research
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This Article uses the individual petitions system under the First Option8
al Protocol (the “OP”) to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
9
Rights (the “ICCPR”) as a case study in order to shed some light on the actual practice of the right to access international justice. The United Nations
Human Rights Committee (the “HRC”)—the treaty body responsible for
overseeing the implementation of the ICCPR—is of special interest to researchers since it is a high profile and internationally acclaimed quasijudicial body that can accept individual communications against 115 states.
Although over one billion people have been under the jurisdiction of the
10
HRC since 1977, as of March 2014, petitioners brought only 2,371 individual communications. This single piece of data can in itself pose grave
doubt as to the success of the idea of access to international justice in the
context of the HRC, or at least trigger further research into this question.
This Article has two main purposes. The first is to describe and evaluate
empirically the right of individuals to access the HRC under the OP in light
of the special goals of this procedure as perceived by the different stakeholders. The second is to recommend ways to improve individuals’ access
to the HRC and thereby to international justice in general. In order to address the first question, the Article uses a mixed-methods approach—a
combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods.
For the quantitative part of the research, I constructed an original dataset of the number of communications brought against different countries
in a given year. Additionally, I coded the various political and socioeconomic characteristics of those countries. This gives us a picture of who most
often uses the individual communications mechanism and what might be the
main obstacles to filing communications with the HRC. I also coded whether individuals were represented in different communications, who represented them (private lawyers or non-governmental organizations
[“NGOs”]), and analyzed whether representation increases the probability
that the HRC finds a violation in the case.

about access to justice in the United States and other industrialized jurisdictions); Matthias
Killian, Alternatives to Public Provision: The Role of Legal Expenses Insurance in Broadening Access to Justice: The German Experience, 30 J.L. & SOC’Y 31 (2003) (describing the
German experience of promoting access to justice); A. A. S. Zuckerman, Lord Woolf’s Access
to Justice: Plus ça change . . ., 59 MOD. L. REV. 773 (1996) (reviewing a report by Lord
Woolf about the problems of access to justice in the United Kingdom).
8.
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (allowing individuals to file communications with the Human Rights Committee [HRC] arguing that at least one of the rights granted to them by the ICCPR has been violated by a member state) [hereinafter Optional Protocol].
9.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
10.
Henry J. Steiner, Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations: What Role
for the Human Rights Committee?, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY
MONITORING 15–17 (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000).
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For the qualitative part of the research, I conducted interviews with 32
applicants, lawyers, and NGOs that brought or helped to bring communications to the HRC. The interviewees were asked questions about their experiences with the process, their difficulties with it, and how they thought the
process could be made more accessible.
I find that there is a significant global inequality in accessing the HRC,
since communications are much more likely to be filed against democratic
countries with high socioeconomic characteristics. There also seems to be a
problem with awareness of the possibility of filing individual communications. Another problem with the accessibility of the system is state intimidation of applicants who have filed communications to the HRC. Many procedural problems also stem from the fact that the Secretariat—and the HRC
itself—is very much underfunded. However, the system is widely perceived
as fair, and most of the applicants would recommend filing communications
to the HRC to others. In order to make recommendations about increasing
the accessibility of the HRC, I use both the empirical findings of this Article
and recommendations about increasing access to justice that have been discussed in the general literature on the subject.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides the theoretical background for the research. It introduces the concept of access to justice in the
national and international context and explains what the HRC and the OP
are. Part II explains the research question in detail and elaborates on the research methods used in this Article. Part III constitutes the empirical part of
the Article—both the quantitative analysis of the dataset and the analysis of
the interviews. Finally, Part IV evaluates the success of the individual
communications system and proposes possible reforms.

I. Access to Justice
A. What is Access to Justice?
The discussion about individuals’ ability to access institutions in order
to realize their legal rights started not in the international legal context, but
11
rather in the national. The basic assumption is that having certain rights
does not ensure the implementation of those rights, so procedural guarantees
are also needed. It is argued that equal justice should necessarily imply
equal access to the justice system, and that procedural justice is one of the

11.
Aristotle saw a just society as one that “empowers and enables citizens to realize
their virtue and take what they deserve.” Patrick Keyzer et al., What is ‘Access to Justice’ and
What does it Require?, in ACCESS TO INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1 (Patrick Keyzer et al. eds.,
2015). In more modern times, Martha Nussbaum addressed the idea that it is important to
support the capability of people to address injustices. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 9 (2009).

Access to Justice
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12

ways to attain social justice. Along these lines, the term “access to justice”
was originally defined as “[t]he system by which people may vindicate their
13
rights and/or resolve their disputes under the general auspices of the state.”
Access to justice is not limited to access to official courts, but rather includes a variety of legal institutions such as quasi-judicial institutions, administrative bodies, arbitration, and even tribal courts that apply local cus14
tomary laws.
Even though, in recent years, the main discussion in the context of access to justice has been about the financial ability of people to bring a case
before a court or another legal institution, the problem is not only finan15
cial. The term “access to justice” generally refers to the ability of an indi16
vidual to bring his case before a court and have a judicial process. It also
means that the individual has a right to have his case adjudicated in a fair
17
and just way. This Article focuses on the idea of access to justice in the
broader sense—i.e., the evaluation of the possibility of an individual to
bring his case before an institution and receive a fair process and a just decision that can be implemented at the national level.
Access to justice is of special importance to the weaker members of society, since the assumption is that others can protect their interests through
18
alternative economic and political measures. Marginalized members of society, in contrast, lack the power and resources to guarantee their rights, and
19
courts are seen as having an important role in protecting their interests.
This is especially true for developing countries with fragile democracies and
20
significant economic inequalities. Despite that, research conducted in vari-

12.
Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice: Connecting Principles to Practice, 17 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 369, 372 (2004).
13.
MARIA FEDERICA MOSCATI, THE ROLE OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND ACCESS
TO JUSTICE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND DEMOCRATIC ADVANCEMENT 9 (2015), http://
www.democraticprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/MOSCATI_TRANSITIONALJUSTICE-Proof.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
14.
THE HAGUE INST. FOR INNOVATION OF LAW, TREND REPORT/PART 1: TOWARDS
BASIC JUSTICE CARE FOR EVERYONE 5, 8, 17 (2012) [hereinafter HIIL]; THE COMM’N ON
LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR & UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAM [UNDP], 2
MAKING THE LAW WORK FOR EVERYONE 25–27, 42–53 (2008) [hereinafter COMM’N ON
LEGAL EMPOWERMENT]; UNDP, PROGRAMMING FOR JUSTICE: ACCESS FOR ALL 60–100
(2005) [hereinafter UNDP 2005].
15.
See Marc Galanter, Access to Justice in a World of Expanding Social Capability, 37
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 115 (2010).
16.
Francioni, supra note 4, at 1.
17.
Id.
18.
UNDP 2005, supra note 14, at 23.
19.
See ROSIE WAGNER, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT
AGENDA 20 (2013) (arguing that access to justice can challenge existing distributions of power and resources).
20.
HIIL, supra note 14, at 28–29; see also Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Reimagining Access to Justice in the Poor People’s Courts, 22 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 473 (2015) (dis-
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ous national jurisdictions shows that often the most vulnerable members of
a society, who need the protection of the courts the most, are in practice the
21
ones to whom the courts are least accessible. This situation is frequently
22
referred to in the literature as the “access to justice gap[.]”

B. Access to Justice in International Law
There is much to be written and discussed about individuals’ access to
international courts and other institutions. However, since the methodology
of the current research is not comparative but rather uses the HRC as a case
study, this part will provide only a brief introduction to the subject. It will
highlight the relevant points for understanding the general context and the
problems that individuals might face with accessing justice in the international sphere.
The literature suggests that individuals’ access to international judicial
institutions is important because “private actors are more numerous and
would appear especially likely to pursue cases that are either too politically
‘hot’ or a low priority for international commissions or states with limited
23
resources and conflicting priorities.” There seems to be a general agreement that individual access to international institutions serves two main
24
purposes. The first is providing the individual bringing his case to an in25
ternational institution with a remedy. The second is to promote change and
26
develop jurisprudence on a specific subject matter. It is also argued that a
judgment of an international court carries symbolic value by highlighting
27
the violations and individual suffering to an international audience and

cussing the importance of access to justice for the empowerment of marginalized groups in the
national context).
21.
Id. The literature suggests two barriers that might be of special significance to marginalized groups. The first barrier is language. Many times, legal procedures and information
about legal rights are available only in the language of the majority in the country. The second
barrier is geographical distance from courts, which can sometimes be an obstacle because it is
burdensome and costly for individuals to come to a court to file a lawsuit and to participate in
the procedures. See HIIL, supra note 14, at 43; UNDP 2005, supra note 14, at 19; WAGNER,
supra note 19, at 20; Martin Gramatikov, A Framework for Measuring the Costs of Paths to
Justice, J. JURIS. 111, 118–19 (2009).
22.
HIIL, supra note 14, at 45; UNDP 2005, supra note 14, at 3, 6.
23.
Alter, supra note 6, at 24.
24.
Lorna McGregor, The Role of Supranational Human Rights Litigation in Strengthening Remedies for Torture Nationally, 16 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 737, 742 (2012).
25.
Freek van der Vet, Holding on to Legalism: The Politics of Russian Litigation on
Torture and Discrimination Before the European Court of Human Rights, 23 SOC. & LEGAL
STUD. 361, 362 (2014) [hereinafter van der Vet, Holding on to Legalism].
26.
Id.; McGregor, supra note 24, at 741.
27.
See %DúDNÇali, The Logics of Supranational Human Rights Litigation, Official Acknowledgment, and Human Rights Reform: The Southeast Turkey Cases before the European
Court of Human Rights 1996–2006, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 311 (2010).
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serving as an anti-narrative to state violence. Finally, international courts
29
can serve a function resembling that of truth commissions, or even that of
30
constitutional courts.
International institutions accessible to individuals play a part in promoting the recognition and implementation of human rights and promoting
31
marginalized communities. For instance, especially in the European context, supranational litigation has helped to promote the human rights of mi32
norities, LGBT communities, and torture victims, as well as social rights.
Also, in the context of the Inter-American system, regional institutions have
helped promote issues such as the struggle against enforced disappearances
33
and indigenous rights. The Inter-American system might also have played
a part in the struggle for democratizing the region, creating a platform for
34
discourse on freedom of expression and non-discrimination. However, as
will be discussed further in this Article, there is a serious problem with implementing the decisions of those institutions, and international institutions
are likely to influence domestic policies only after repeated litigation on the
35
subject.
In the context of international litigation, NGOs are seen as important
actors, and in some institutions, they even have standing in their own right,
though the specific roles they play vary. Whereas, in the African and InterAmerican systems, NGOs are involved in a variety of cases, in the European
36
system, NGOs are involved mainly in litigation against specific countries.

28.
Id.
29.
Dia Anagnostou, Does European human rights law matter? Implementation and
domestic impact of Strasbourg Court judgments on minority-related policies, 14 INT’L J.
HUM. RTS. 721 (2010).
30.
Alter, supra note 6, at 22–23, 25 (arguing that international human rights courts
usually play a role of constitutional courts for checks and balances and are better able to induce state respect for international law).
31.
Vivek Maru, Access to Justice and Legal Empowerment: A Review of World Bank
Practice, 2 HAGUE J. RULE L. 259 (2010); van der Vet, Holding on to Legalism, supra note
25, at 364; WAGNER, supra note 19, at 21.
32.
Lisa Conant, Individuals, Courts, and the Development of European Social Rights,
39 COMP. POL. STUD. 76 (2006); Maru, supra note 31, at 364; McGregor, supra note 24, at
739; van der Vet, Holding on to Legalism, supra note 25, at 321.
33.
Thomas M. Antkowiak, Rights, Resources, and Rhetoric: Indigenous Peoples and
the Inter-American Court, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 113, 125–26 (2013); Conant, supra note 32.
34.
David C. Baluarte, Strategizing For Compliance: The Evolution of a Compliance
Phase of Inter-American Court Litigation and the Strategic Imperative For Victims’ Representatives, 27 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 263, 320 (2012); Ariel Dulitzky, Too Little, Too Late:
The Pace of Adjudication of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 35 LOY. L.A.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 131, 131–33 (2013); see also PARLETT, supra note 2, at 3 (suggesting
that access to justice has a potential to promote democratic processes and human development).
35.
Anagnostou, supra note 29, at 721.
36.
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, NGO Standing and Influence in Regional Human Rights
Courts and Commissions, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 911, 913–14, 937 (2011); van Der Vet, Hold-
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In the context of the European system in particular, it is generally considered that NGOs file complaints of a higher quality than those of other liti37
gants and help promote marginalized groups that would not otherwise
38
have had access to the international system. NGOs engage in litigation
both for the benefit of the specific applicants they represent and to promote
39
awareness of widespread human rights violations. This sort of strategic litigation has raised the concern that applicants are not selected for the value
of the process to them as individuals, but rather for their relative possible
contribution to the goal of the litigation. As a consequence of this aim, the
specific applicant’s needs and desired remedy are not the top priority in the
40
litigation.
One of the major obstacles to accessing international justice is the lack
of awareness of the possibility of filing cases and the rights protected by
41
human rights treaties. In general, it seems that private enforcement through
42
international legal mechanisms remains largely a European phenomenon.
The small number of cases filed in the African system is not representative
43
of the problematic human rights situation in the region. It is suggested that
this inconsistency can be attributed to illiteracy and lack of awareness of the
44
existence of the mechanism. Whereas the African legal system has adjudi45
cated only 285 cases since its establishment in 1988, the European region46
al system had 64,850 pending applications in the year 2015 alone.

ing on to Legalism, supra note 25, at 362; Freek van der Vet, Seeking Life, Finding Justice:
Russian NGO Litigation and Chechen Disappearances Before the European Court of Human
Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. REV. 303, 304 (2012) [hereinafter van der Vet, Seeking Life, Finding
Justice].
37.
van der Vet, Holding on to Legalism, supra note 25, at 364.
38.
van der Vet, Seeking Life, Finding Justice, supra note 36, at 304.
39.
Id.
40.
van der Vet, Holding on to Legalism, supra note 25, at 371; van der Vet, Seeking
Life, Finding Justice, supra note 36, at 315.
41.
Udeme Essien, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Eleven
Years After, 6 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93, 106 (2000). For a discussion of lack of awareness
as a major barrier to accessing justice in the national context, see HIIL, supra note 14, at 24–
25, 139; UNDP 2005, supra note 14, at 139; Gramatikov, supra note 21, at 118–19 (arguing
that there is a general problem both regarding the awareness of the existence of substantial
rights, as well as awareness of the possibility to solve the problem through a legal institution).
42.
Alter, supra note 6, at 43.
43.
GEORGE MUKUNDI WACHIRA, MINORITY RIGHTS GRP. INT’L, AFRICAN COURT ON
HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: TEN YEARS ON AND STILL NO JUSTICE 10–11 (2008); Daniel
Abebe, Does International Human Rights Law in African Courts Make a Difference?, 56 VA.
J. INT’L L. 527, 553–54 (2016).
44.
Essien, supra note 41, at 106.
45.
Abebe, supra note 43, at 10.
46.
Pending Applications Allocated to a Judicial Formation 31/12/2015, EUR. CT.
HUM. RTS., http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_pending_2015_BIL.pdf (last visited
Oct. 4, 2018).
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Additionally, the different international mechanisms granting individuals access are not used equally by people from all relevant states. However,
filing patterns can sometimes be explained by factors such as the population
of the state and the human rights situation in it. For instance, in the African
region, most of the cases are filed against eight states; some can be ex47
plained by large populations, some by internal conflicts. In the European
system, as of 2015, Ukraine, Russia, and Turkey had the most cases pending
48
against them. These are all states with large populations and problematic
human rights records relative to the region.
Another possible obstacle to accessing international institutions is the
requirement to exhaust domestic remedies. The idea is that states, as sovereigns, are responsible for implementing international human rights, and international institutions should intervene only if states fail in correctly im49
plementing those rights. However, it seems that international institutions
are quite lenient with applicants about exhaustion of domestic remedies in
cases where it is clear that domestic institutions will not be effective or in50
dependent.
In the national context, the need for legal representation is regarded as a
51
major obstacle to accessing legal institutions. Some international institutions are aware of the fact that this might be a problem and address it accordingly. For instance, in the European Court, the African Court, and the
Inter-American Commission, applicants can apply for legal aid if they are
52
unable to pay for representation. However, in the European and Inter-

47.
Abebe, supra note 43, at 548.
48.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS 2015, at 8
(2016), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2015_ENG.pdf (Oct. 4, 2018).
49.
ANTONIA TRINDADE, THE ACCESS OF INDIVIDUALS TO INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
100–08 (2011); YOGESH TYAGI, THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 471 (2011).
50.
Çali, supra note 27, at 320; Juan E. Méndez & José Miguel Vivanco, Disappearances and the Inter-American Court: Reflections on a Litigation Experience, 13 HAMLINE L.
REV. 507, 537–38 (1990); McGregor, supra note 24, at 738–39. It should be noted that corruption in the legal system and the bureaucracy are also seen as a serious impediment for an
individual to access a legal institution, have a fair procedure, and receive a just decision in his
case. See HIIL, supra note 14, at 43; UNDP 2005, supra note 14, at 82.
51.
UNDP, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 4, 12 (2004); UNDP 2005, supra note 14, at 139; Mark
Findlay, Internationalised Criminal Trial and Access to Justice, 2 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 237,
250 (2002); Gramatikov, supra note 21, at 117; WAGNER, supra note 19, at 20; see also Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869 (2009)
(discussing legal cost as a barrier to access to justice in national jurisdictions).
52.
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and People’s Rights art. 10, June 9, 1998, OAU Doc.
OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III); European Court of Human Rights, Rules of Court,
COUNCIL EUR., r. 100–05, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf (last
visited Oct. 4, 2018); Inter-Am. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Rules of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on the Legal Assistance Fund of the Inter-American Human Rights System, arts. 3–4, OAS, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/fund.asp#tab1 (last visited
Oct. 4, 2018).
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American systems, legal assistance is not granted from the beginning of the
procedure but rather only at later stages. In the African system, legal assistance is provided only for cases before the court, but not those before com53
mission.
Finally, implementing international institutions’ decisions seems to be a
54
major problem. In recent years, international institutions have moved away
from issuing merely declaratory orders toward issuing more specific or55
ders. However, states that do not respect human rights in general are not
56
likely to respect the decisions of human rights institutions. Unlike state
compliance with the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (the
“ECtHR”), state compliance with the decisions of the Inter-American Court
and the African Commission is low. For instance, whereas around 56% of
57
the European Court’s decisions are fully implemented, only 20% of the
58
decisions of the Inter-American Court are fully implemented. In the Afri59
can system, it is around 14%. It is suggested that, in the European context,
states tend to implement the decisions of the court because they are more
democratic in general and not necessarily because of the way in which the
60
system itself operates. More generally, states are more likely to implement
decisions granting monetary compensation than decisions requiring broader
61
political or legislative reforms. The low rate of implementation may also
62
be attributable in part to the lack of clarity in decisions.

53.
Guidelines for the Submission of Communications, AFR. COMM’N HUM. &
PEOPLES’
RTS.,
http://www.achpr.org/files/pages/communications/guidelines/
achpr_infosheet_communications_eng.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
54.
See Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229, 1315 (2004)
(finding that compliance with judgments of the International Court of Justice is around 68%);
see also OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, FROM JUDGMENT TO JUSTICE: IMPLEMENTING
INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DECISIONS 1, 119 (2010), https://
www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/from-judgment-to-justice-20101122.pdf
(last visited Oct. 4, 2018) (providing additional data on implementation of judgments in the
European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights).
55.
McGregor, supra note 24, at 737.
56.
See James L. Cavallaro & Stephanie Erin Brewer, Reevaluating Regional Human
Rights Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the Inter-American Court, 102
AM. J. INT’L L. 768, 770 (2008).
57.
Dia Anagnostou & Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Domestic Implementation of Human
Rights Judgments in Europe: Legal Infrastructure and Government Effectiveness Matter, 25
EUR. J. INT’L L. 205, 215 (2014).
58.
David C. Baluarte, Strategizing for Compliance: The Evolution of a Compliance
Phase of Inter-American Court Litigation and the Strategic Imperative for Victims’ Representatives, 27 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 263, 290 (2012).
59.
Abebe, supra note 43, at 14.
60.
See Cavallaro & Brewer, supra note 56, at 774–75.
61.
Id. at 785; van der Vet, Seeking Life, Finding Justice, supra note 36, at 320.
62.
Abebe, supra note 43, at 551; McGregor, supra note 24, at 747.
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In conclusion, it seems that potential applicants are likely to face quite
similar difficulties accessing justice in the international context as in the national one in many regards. The most important problem, which might be
even more acute in the international system, is the lack of awareness of the
possibility of filing a communication with an international institution. Another important aspect is that the European system appears to be the most
widely used and effective system, and its membership includes more democratic and developed countries. Finally, there seems to be a serious problem
with implementing decisions of international institutions, which might deter
individuals from bringing communications in the first place if their primary
goal is receiving a remedy.

C. Improving Access to Justice
Due to the significant problems with the accessibility of legal institutions, some scholars proposed suggestions to improve access to justice.
These suggestions have been proposed mainly in the context of national jurisdictions, but they are relevant to the international sphere as well. Since
awareness of rights and the need for legal help are seen as the central problems for access to justice, most of the suggestions focus on them. The first
suggestion is to broaden awareness through focused legal education, targeted especially at marginalized communities. This can be done using various
methods, including community-based education, radio and television broad63
casts, as well as printed material. Other helpful methods for disseminating
information are through social networks, NGOs, local bar associations, and
64
the internet.
As to the problem of overcoming the need for legal assistance, the suggestions are divided into two aspects. The first aspect is simplifying legal
procedures so that some cases can be brought without the need for professional assistance. This includes simplifying the legal procedures themselves
65
as well as the necessary legal documents. Some of the latest developments
in this field include computer programs that help people without legal edu66
cation to fill out legal forms. However, as Deborah Rhode rightfully notes,
67
these developments mainly benefit the educated population, and many
marginalized populations are still in need of some sort of legal assistance.
Hence, many scholars encourage developing legal assistance through clinics
at law schools, pro bono programs at law firms, and NGOs as the second

63.
COMM’N ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT, supra note 14, at 19, 23; Maru, supra note
31, at 263.
64.
COMM’N ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT, supra note 14, at 21.
65.
Id. at 18, 36.
66.
Rhode, supra note 51, at 869.
67.
Id. at 883.
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68

aspect. Specifically regarding NGOs, it is suggested that it is particularly
helpful if they bundle legal help together with other programs for assisting
69
the poor. Finally, since most of the organizations have limited resources,
and taking into account the access to justice gap, it is suggested that the efforts should be targeted at vulnerable populations, especially rural popula70
tions and minority communities.
It is fair to say that there is no systematic research about which of these
71
interventions is the most effective, or even if they are effective at all.
There also seems to be no clear solution that fits all countries at all times,
and some scholars suggest that different interventions should be tailored to
72
the specific legal system. Finally, since the resources of the state and the
different organizations are limited, some suggest that the prioritization of
intervention should be “demand oriented”—i.e., understanding from the
people themselves where they have the most need for intervention in order
73
to access legal institutions.

II. The United Nations Human Rights Committee
A. General Background
The ICCPR protects people’s most basic civil and political rights. The
rights protected by the ICCPR include the right to life, the right not to be
tortured, freedom of speech, and the right for equal treatment before the
74
75
law. Currently, 170 states have joined the Covenant. The HRC was established under part IV of the ICCPR in order to monitor the implementation of
the various rights by the State parties. The HRC consists of 18 Committee
76
Members (“CMs”) elected by states which are members to the ICCPR.
The OP grants individuals the right to bring individual communications

68.
Frank S. Bloch, Access to Justice and the Global Clinical Movement, 28 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 111 (2008) (discussing how clinics at law school can assist individuals from all
over the world to access legal institutions); Alex J. Hurder, Nonlawyer Legal Assistance and
Access to Justice, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241 (1999) (discussing how non-lawyers can assist
low income families and marginalized groups to access legal institutions).
69.
COMM’N ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT, supra note 14, at 335.
70.
UNDP, supra note 51, at 10, 12; Rhode, supra note 51, at 898–99.
71.
Maurits Barendrecht, Legal Aid, Accessible Courts or Legal Information? Three
Access to Justice Strategies Compared, 11 GLOBAL JURIST 1, 1 (2011).
72.
See, e.g., Richard Nash, Financing Access to Justice: Innovating Possibilities to
Promote Access for All, 5 HAGUE J. RULE L. 96, 114 (2013).
73.
Barendrecht, supra note 71, at 1, 7.
74.
ICCPR, supra note 9, arts. 6, 7, 19, 26.
75.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION,
at
1,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/
Chapter%20IV/IV-4.en.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
76.
ICCPR, supra note 9, at Part IV.
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77

against member states to the HRC. The OP was opened for signature on
December 16, 1966 and came into force on March 23, 1976. Currently, 116
78
states are signatories to the OP. This makes the HRC the most universal
international institution individuals can access to receive remedies for violations of their human rights.
Andrew Byrnes famously argued that the individual communications
system in the HRC serves three purposes: (1) providing an effective and
timely remedy to a person whose rights have been violated; (2) bringing law
and practice changes in the state against which the petition was brought; and
(3) providing guidance to other State parties on the meanings and guaran79
tees in the treaties, as well as the measures needed to implement them.
There seems to be some disagreement between scholars as to what is the
80
primary goal of the procedure under the OP. It might also be the case that
different stakeholders (i.e., the states, the individuals, and the HRC) have
different understandings of the primary goal of the individual communications procedure.
The OP itself states in the Preamble that the individual communications
mechanism was established to “achieve the purposes of the ICCPR . . . and
81
the implementation of its provisions.” No additional purpose for the individual communications mechanism is mentioned in the OP. Some scholars
have commented that State parties intentionally left the purpose of the OP
82
vague. The travaux préparatoires of the OP might suggest that implemen-

Optional Protocol, supra note 8, arts. 1, 2.
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, at 1, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/
Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-5.en.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
79.
See generally Andrew Byrnes, An Effective Complaint Procedure in the Context of
International Human Rights Law, in THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 139, 142 (Anne F. Bayefsky ed., 2000). See generally TYAGI, supra note 49, at 5–
11 (describing the purposes, methodology, and scope of his study on the Human Rights
Committee).
80.
See generally TYAGI, supra note 49, at 115, 141, 143 (arguing that the main goal of
the procedure is to provide a remedy in a specific case); Geir Ulfstein, Individual Complaints,
in UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES: LAW AND LEGITIMACY 73, 105 (Helen Keller &
Geir Ulfstein eds., 2012) (arguing that the core function of a treaty body is advancing international human rights law, as opposed to providing relief in individual cases); Martin Scheinin,
Access to Justice Before International Human Rights Bodies: Reflections on the Practice of
the UN Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights, in ACCESS TO
JUSTICE AS A HUMAN RIGHT 135–52 (Francesco Francioni ed., 2007) (arguing that the main
purpose of a treaty body is to develop jurisprudence regarding the obligations of states under
the ICCPR [both in the respondent state and in other member states]).
81.
Optional Protocol, supra note 8, pmbl.; see also Yuval Shany, The Effectiveness of
the Human Rights Committee and the Treaty Bodies Reform, in DER STAAT IM RECHT 1307,
1312–16 (Marten Breuer et al. eds., 2013) (discussing the history of the purpose of the Optional Protocol).
82.
See, e.g., Steiner, supra note 10, at 17.
77.
78.
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tation was meant more in a general manner (like providing general guide83
lines to states) rather than requiring dispute resolution in a specific case.
Although the original intention of the State parties might not have been
to provide individuals with a remedy enforceable at the national level, the
HRC itself has been active in promoting its decisions under the OP as binding upon the State parties—not as mere recommendations. In General
Comment 33, the HRC stated that, in its view, decisions under the OP
should be implemented by State parties, and that the remedy for a specific
84
violation is an important part of implementation. For instance, the HRC
points out that article 2(3) of the ICCPR grants a remedy for a violation of a
right protected by the Covenant, and it constantly refers to this paragraph in
85
its decisions in individual communications. Moreover, in 1997, the HRC
appointed a special rapporteur for the “follow-up of views” to monitor the
compliance of states with decisions under the OP. State compliance is re86
ported in the annual report of the HRC to the General Assembly. Finally,
the HRC also established a procedure for petitioners to request interim
measures “to avoid irreparable damage to the victim of the alleged viola87
tion.”
A final place to find additional purposes of the OP is the ICCPR itself,
which the procedure under the OP is designed to implement. The Preamble
of the ICCPR mentions that the “recognition of inherent dignity and of the
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” The preamble also recognizes the responsibility of states under the Charter of the United Nations (the “UN”) to promote “universal respect for, and observance of, hu88
human rights and freedoms.” Therefore, it seems that a general purpose of
the ICCPR is not abstract implementation of human rights, but rather the
universality and equality of the implementation of those rights around the
globe.

83.
See Shany, The Effectiveness of the Human Rights Committee and the Treaty Bodies Reform, supra note 81, at 13, 15–16.
84.
See Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 33: The Obligations of State Parties
Under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ¶ 18,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/33 (Nov. 5, 2008) [hereinafter General Comment 33].
85.
See id. ¶¶ 14, 20.
86.
See id. ¶¶ 15–17; Hum. Rts. Comm., Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights
Committee, r. 101, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/3/Rev.10 (Jan. 11, 2012) [hereinafter Rules of Procedure].
87.
General Comment 33, supra note 84, ¶ 19; Rules of Procedure, supra note 86, r. 92.
88.
ICCPR, supra note 9, pmbl.
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B. Access to Justice in the HRC
This subsection will elaborate on some of the basic aspects of access to
89
justice in the HRC. In order for the HRC to consider a communication
90
filed to it, certain admissibility requirements need to be met. These are the
central requirements as set by the OP and the HRC Rules of Procedure:
91
(a) The communication is not anonymous;
(b) The communication comes from an individual (or individ92
uals) subject to the jurisdiction of a State party to the OP;
(c) The individual claims, in a substantiated manner, to be a
victim of a violation by that State party of any of the rights
93
set forth in the ICCPR;
(d) The communication does not constitute an abuse of the
94
right of submission;
(e) The same matter is not examined under another interna95
tional procedure;
96
(f) All possible domestic remedies have been exhausted.
Upon receipt, the communication is first sent to the secretariat of the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (the “secretariat”),
97
which insures that some minimum standards are met. After the initial
screening, the communication is sent to the HRC Special Rapporteur on
98
New Communications. The Special Rapporteur ensures that the communication contains all the necessary information and officially registers the
complaint. She may also decide to adopt a decision on interim measures to
99
avoid irreparable damage to the victim of the alleged violation. After the
registration of the communication, the State party is usually asked to make
submissions within six months on both the admissibility and the merits of
100
the communication. It should be noted that the HRC decides a case only

89.
A more detailed discussion, together with more explanations, can be found in the
relevant sections of infra Part III.
90.
Optional Protocol, supra note 8, arts. 1–3, 5; see also Rules of Procedure, supra
note 86, r. 93.
91.
Optional Protocol, supra note 8, art. 3.
92.
Id. art. 1.
93.
Id. art. 2.
94.
Id. art. 3.
95.
Id. art. 5, ¶ 2(a).
96.
Id. art. 5, ¶ 2(b).
97.
See TYAGI, supra note 49, at 432.
98.
The HRC Special Rapporteur on New Communications is a member of the Human
Rights Committee that is elected by the Committee Members themselves for the position. See
Rules of Procedure, supra note 86, r. 95, para. 3; SUZANNE EGAN, THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATY SYSTEM: LAW AND PROCEDURE 258 (2011).
99.
See Rules of Procedure, supra note 86, r. 92.
100.
See id. r. 97, para. 2.
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on the basis of the written material submitted to it and does not hold oral
101
hearings.
After the registration of a new communication, a special rapporteur is
102
appointed for each communication. The identity of the specific rapporteur
103
is not known to the public. The special rapporteur, with the assistance of
the secretariat, prepares initial recommendations and eventually a draft resolution for the HRC to discuss at its session. Prior to the discussion in the
HRC, the draft is reviewed by a special Working Group on New Communications, both on the question of admissibility and on the question of mer104
its. The decision of the HRC in a certain communication can be one of
four: inadmissible; admissible (in the rare cases that admissibility is decided
separately from the merits); no violation; or violation. In case of a violation,
the HRC also indicates the appropriate remedy for the violation.
As will be discussed further, the procedure under the OP was designed
to be simple and straightforward in order to make the HRC accessible to individuals. However, given the low number of communications actually filed
under the OP over the years, there seems to be a problem either with the design of the procedure or with its de facto implementation by the HRC.

III. Research Design
A. Motivation for the Study
The ICCPR is probably the most famous—and one of the most ratified—human rights treaties, and the HRC itself is the most high-profile UN
treaty body. For that reason, it is very surprising that such a small number of
individual communications have been filed with it over the years. It seems
that, because of its prestige and relative independence, the HRC can potentially help raise awareness of human rights problems, develop important jurisprudence on many subjects, and provide individuals with needed remedies through the individual communications system. This is especially true
for people from regions that do not have effective and accessible regional
human rights systems—mainly Asia, Africa, and some former communist
105
countries. Also, theoretically, the system should be quite accessible because there are no oral hearings and the entire process is done in writing.

101.
See Optional Protocol, supra note 8, art. 5, ¶ 1.
102.
Rules of Procedure, supra note 86, r. 95, para. 3.
103.
See TYAGI, supra note 49, at 434.
104.
Rules of Procedure, supra note 86, r. 93–95, 100.
105.
A qualitative research study conducted on the communications filed against Australia, a country that does not have an alternative HR tribunal, found that most of the applicants felt the process of filing a communication was worthwhile. See Olivia Ball, All the Way
to the UN: Is Petitioning a UN Human-Rights Treaty Body Worthwhile?, 385–86 (Dec. 20,
2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Monash University) (on file with the author of this Article).
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However, for some reason, the system does not fulfill its potential. Therefore, this Article seeks to evaluate the success of the system, understand the
main difficulties in accessing it, and make recommendations for improvement. Moreover, since individuals are being granted standing before an increasing number of international institutions, the lessons learned from the
HRC can shed light on the general question of how to make international
institutions more accessible.
As mentioned above, the term “access to justice” is very broad, and the
main question is how to evaluate the success of an institution in this regard.
Yuval Shany suggests that assessment of the success of international courts
should start from understanding the goal that the institution aims to
106
achieve. After understanding the goals of the institution, we can develop
specific criteria that may assist us in evaluating the system. However, understanding the goal of a specific institution is not a simple endeavor. As
107
Shany discusses, goals can be both stated and unstated, different stakeholders may have different goals, and there might also be differences in
108
goals among the same stakeholders. Therefore, the first step is to understand what the different stakeholders sought to achieve by granting individuals access to the HRC. This Article evaluates this question from the perspectives of three stakeholders—the States parties to the OP, the HRC, and
109
the individual applicants. Whereas the goals of the OP, as perceived by
the member states and the HRC, were discussed in Section II.a., the qualitative-empirical part of the Article assesses this question from the applicants’
point of view.

B. Research Questions and Method
I use three criteria in order to evaluate access to justice in the HRC. The
first criterion is universality and equality of access to the HRC. This criterion asks which countries most of the communications come from, and spe-

106.
Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based
Approach, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 225, 227, 230 (2012) [hereinafter Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts]. It should be noted that, whereas Shany discussed mainly
assessing the effectiveness of international courts, this paper focuses on access to justice. See
also Mauro Cappelletti et al., Access to Justice: Variations and Continuity of a World-Wide
Movement, 46 J. COMP. & INT’L L. 664 (1992) (discussing different political and critical approaches to the concept of “access to justice” in the context of national jurisdictions).
107.
Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts, supra note 106, at 242.
108.
See id. at 240–42.
109.
Although Shany’s proposal was developed mainly in order to evaluate the effectiveness of international courts, it also suggests many important insights for evaluating the
accessibility of other legal institutions, including quasi-judicial tribunals like the HRC. This is
mainly because it guides us to understand the expectations of the different stakeholders from
granting individual access to international institutions and accordingly to evaluate the success
of the procedure. Shany himself applied the goal-based approach to the UN treaty bodies. See
Shany, The Effectiveness of the Human Rights Committee and the Treaty Bodies Reform, supra note 81.
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cifically whether an “access to justice gap” exists on the international level.
The second criterion is difficulties with accessing the HRC. This criterion
aims to understand the main difficulties that applicants face with accessing
the HRC—for instance, awareness of the existence of the procedure, resources needed for filing a communication, and fear of state persecution.
The third criterion is interpersonal impressions of the process. This criterion
is more subjective than the other two and tries to understand how the process itself is perceived from the perspective of the applicants. For instance, I
examine whether the process is perceived as just and whether the interviewees recommend filing communications to others in light of their personal
experiences. The subjective experience of people with legal institutions is
regarded to be of special importance in evaluating access to justice in legal
systems since research shows that people’s perception of institutions as just
110
is very dependent on whether they think that the procedure was fair.
This Article uses a mixed-methods approach—both quantitative (regression analysis) and qualitative (interviews). Using both methods provides
111
the best understanding of access to justice in the HRC. As Greene and
Carcelli argue, using a mixed research method allows the researcher to
evaluate both “the realist objectivist, value-neutral perspective and the con112
structivist, subjectivist value-engaged perspective.” In this case, the quantitative analysis provides a general picture of the distribution of the possibility to access the HRC and can indicate whether an “access to justice gap”
exists in the international context. It can also provide indications as to what
might be the difficulties that potential applicants face with accessing the
HRC. Finally, it can provide some relevant data on the rate of representation
before the HRC and the identity of the representatives.
On the other hand, the qualitative analysis allows us to understand
much more in depth people’s difficulties in accessing the HRC since many

110.
Laura Klaming & Ivo Giesen, Access to Justice: The Quality of the Procedure 14
(TISCO Working Paper Series on Civil Law and Conflict Resolution Sys. No. 002/2008,
2008), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1
091105 (last visited Oct. 4, 2018). Procedural justice seems to be equally important to people
from different cultures, and procedural justice seems to be defined largely in terms of the
same variables across cultures. See Brockner et al., Culture and Procedural Justice: The Influence of Power Distance on Reactions to Voice, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 300
(2001); See Lind et al., Procedural Context and Culture: Variation in the Antecedents of Procedural Justice Judgments, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 767 (1997); Ikuo Sugawara
& Yuen J. Huo, Disputes in Japan: A Cross-Cultural Test of the Procedural Justice Model, 7
SOC. JUST. RES. 129 (1994).
111.
See generally JOHN W. CREWSWELL, RESEARCH DESIGN: QUALITATIVE,
QUANTITATIVE, AND MIXED METHODS APPROACHES (4th ed. 2014); Mario Luis Small, How
to Conduct a Mixed Methods Study: Recent Trends in a Rapidly Growing Literature, 37 ANN.
REV. SOC. 57 (2011) (providing an introduction to recent trends in mixed-methods research).
112.
Jennifer C. Greene & Valerie J. Caracellie, Making Paradigmatic Sense of Mixed
Methods Practice, in HANDBOOK OF MIXED METHODS IN SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH
91, 94 (Abbas Tashakkori & Charles Teddlie eds., 1st ed., 2003).
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aspects of access to justice cannot be evaluated merely by analyzing numbers. Moreover, quantitative data cannot answer questions regarding the
subjective experiences of people with the procedure. Interviews with applicants can give the best understanding of the goal of the individual communications procedure from the applicants’ perspective.
There are several suggestions for how to evaluate the quality of a judicial procedure, and in particular the accessibility of judicial institutions.
This Article focuses on the criteria proposed by Gramatikov, Barendrecht,
113
114
and Verdonschot, as well as by Klaming & Gissen, together with in115
sights from other scholars. As will be further elaborated in Part III, I
adopted the indicators suggested in the context of the national courts and
added indicators relevant to the context of international law, and the HRC in
particular. This was done considering the specific goals of the HRC and the
quantitative findings.

IV. Evaluating Access to Justice under the OP
A. Quantitative Analysis
In the quantitative part, I will first present and analyze data about global
equality of access to justice, and then I will present and analyze data regarding legal representation before the HRC.

1. Universality and Equality of Access to the HRC
i. Research Question and Hypothesis
As mentioned previously, according to official UN data, only 2,371
communications were filed until March 2014. Even though the original definition of the “access to justice gap” focused on people within a country, it
can also be a good analogy—even if not perfect—at the international level.
Using the same rationale, it seems that the ones who need the HRC the most
are people under the jurisdiction of countries that are the least likely to
comply with the ICCPR. Similarly, according to previous literature, people
from non-democratic and less socioeconomically developed countries are
116
less likely to exercise their rights to access legal institutions. Therefore,
the main hypothesis in this chapter is that people are more likely to file
communications against countries that are more developed and democratic.

113.
See generally Martin Gramatikov et al., Measuring the Costs and Quality of Paths
to Justice: Contours of a Methodology, 3 HAGUE J. RULE L. 349 (2011).
114.
Klaming & Giesen, supra note 110.
115.
Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts, supra note 106 at 254;
see Byrnes, supra note 79; see Scheinin, supra note 80.
116.
See supra Part I.
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ii. Data
The main dependent variable in this section is the number of communications brought against a state in a given year. I coded the number of communications filed against States parties to the OP for every year in which
they were parties (N=1,639). I collected the data from all 799 decisions issued by the HRC between 1997 and 2012. The decisions were taken from
117
the Bayefsky database and supplemented by the UN Treaty Body Data118
base (for decisions published after July 27, 2012). It is important to note
that states entered the dataset only from the year that they joined the OP.
Therefore, there are states for which not all years are coded. Additionally, as
independent variables, I coded different geographical, political, and socioeconomic characteristics for each state in the specific year of the observation.
I chose to construct a dataset based on decisions issued between 1997–
2013 because my main concern was to understand the current patterns of
filing communications to the HRC and what can be done to make the process more accessible to more people from all over the world. It should be
noted that I could know that a communication was filed in a given year only
if there actually was a decision of the HRC on the communication (either on
admissibility or on merits grounds). Therefore, if a communication was filed
but eventually discontinued, or there was no decision on it at the time that I
119
did the coding, it was not included in the dataset.
In order to test the hypothesis, I use total as a dependent variable—a
count variable indicating the number of communications filed against a state
in a given year. I use the following independent variables: human rights
score of the country, independence of the judiciary score, freedom of speech
score, polity score, rule of law score, GDP per capita (log), and literacy rate.
I also control for three variables that may explain the number of communications filed. First, I control for the existence of an alternative regional human rights institution for the claim, since applicants can usually bring their
120
case only before one international forum. Second, I control for the population of a country, since one should expect more communications filed
against countries with larger populations. Finally, I control for the number
of years that passed between the given year and the year that the country

117.
The United Nations Human Rights Treaties: Jurisprudence: CCPR,
BAYEFSKY.COM,
http://www.bayefsky.com/docs.php/area/jurisprudence/treaty/ccpr/opt/0/
node/5/type/all (last visited Oct. 4, 2018). The project of collecting the communication was
initiated, supervised, and created by Professor Anne Bayefsky of the Touro College.
118.
Treaty Bodies Search, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER,
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en (last visited
Oct. 4, 2018).
119.
I tried to receive information about discontinued communications from the secretariat, but I was told that they do not have it.
120.
See Laurence R. Helfer, Forum Shopping for Human Rights, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
285 (1999).
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first joined the OP, since people might become more aware of the possibil121
ity of filing a communication over time.

iii. Results
The first step is to provide descriptive statistics. The regional distribution of membership in the OP is as follows: 29.57% of the states belong to
the African group, 10.43% to the Asian group, 19.13% to the Eastern European group, 20.87% to the Latin American group, and 20% to the Western
group. When we look at the distribution of the number of communications
on the regional level, we see the following distribution: 8.47% of the communications were filed against African countries, and the same percentage
of communications were filed against Latin American countries. 16.04% of
the communications were brought against Asian countries, 22.15% against
Eastern European countries, and 44.28% against Western countries.
Since the Western group, in general, is regarded as having a better human rights record than other regions, this may indicate that more communications are not necessarily filed against worse human rights violators. This
is even more evident when we compare the percentage of states from the
region parties to the OP with the percentage of communications filed
against states in the region:

Figure 1—Percentage of States Members to the OP and
Percentage of Communications
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When we look at the distribution on the state level, the state against
which most of the communications were filed in the time period of the re121.

See infra Appendix 1.
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search was Spain: 92 communications. Spain is followed by Belarus (54),
Canada (51), Australia (44), and the Czech Republic (42). During the relevant time period, no communications were filed against one-third of the
countries examined. Among the countries against which no communications
were filed are Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, and Malta, as well as countries
122
such as Bolivia, Albania, Chad, Ghana, and Congo.
The next step is to test the hypothesis in a regression that allows us to
control for population, existence of an alternative tribunal, and years since
joining the OP. I use a negative binomial regression model. The negative
binomial model is more appropriate in this case than the Poisson model that
is often used for count models because the Poisson distribution assumes that
the mean and variance of the dependent variable are equal. In the data presented in this Article, however, the mean of the dependent variable total is
0.47 and the variance is 2.11. Moreover, in a goodness-of-fit test for the
Poisson model, the chi-squared value was > 0.000, allowing us to reject the
null hypothesis that the Poisson model is the appropriate one. Finally, the
standard errors were clustered for the different states in all the specifications.
The dependent variable is the number of communications filed against a
state in a given year. Each regression model uses different independent variables that represent the political and socioeconomic situation in a state.
Many independent variables could not be included in the same regression
due to multicollinearity problems; therefore, I use different independent variables interchangeably.

Table 1—Negative Binomial Regression
(1)
Independence

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

0.373**
(0.163)

Polity

0.0282
(0.0258)

Speech

0.129
(0.188)

Human Rights

0.311***
(0.0850)

Rule of Law

0.398***
(0.107)

GDP (log)

0.546***
(0.103)

Literacy

0.0422***
(0.00839)

122.
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Alternative

-1.320***

-1.343***

-1.453***

-0.857***

(0.348)

(0.324)

(0.311)

(0.317)

(0.361)

(0.317)

(0.281)

Population

0.546***

0.523***

0.559***

0.667***

0.555***

0.527***

0.553***

(log)
(0.0905)

(0.111)

(0.102)

(0.117)

(0.0949)

(0.0887)

(0.0924)

Delta year

-0.0921***

-0.110***

-0.108***

-0.112***

-0.102***

-0.126***

-0.107***

(0.0174)

(0.0207)

(0.0170)

(0.0220)

(0.0207)

(0.0203)

(0.0214)

Constant

-8.390***

-7.561***

-8.260***

-10.07***

-8.086***

-12.26***

-12.16***

(1.611)

(1.829)

(1.779)

(1.955)

(1.599)

(1.902)

(1.828)

1,598

1,444

1,599

1,627

1,639

1,557

1,639

Observations

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
From the models above, we can see that all the coefficients of the variables that measure the political and human rights situation in the country are
positive, and the variables of human rights, rule of law, and judicial independence are statistically significant. The coefficients of the GDP and the
literacy variables are also positive and statistically significant. This indicates
that people from more socioeconomically developed countries are more
likely to file communications. As expected, the coefficient of population is
positive and statistically significant. Also, the coefficient indicating the existence of an alternative regional human rights tribunal is negative and statistically significant. Potential applicants probably prefer to bring their cases
before regional tribunals rather than the HRC because their decisions are
more likely to be enforced. Finally, the coefficient of delta year, which indicates the number of years since the state joined the OP, is negative and statistically significant. This is a surprising finding since one might assume
that, with time, the awareness of the existence of a tribunal will be higher
and people will be more likely to file communications with the tribunal. A
possible explanation for this puzzle might be the fact that almost one quarter
of the communications filed to the HRC are from the Eastern European
group, which are countries that belonged to the communist bloc. These
countries joined the OP only in the nineties, and perhaps this is the reason
why the coefficient is negative. A more pessimistic interpretation might be
that potential applicants are discouraged by the lack of state implementation
of previous communications and, therefore, there are fewer communications
filed.
It is also important to look into the question of whether the general pattern is different when we look into the data only in specific regions or in
narrower time frames. Therefore, I ran two additional sets of regressions: by
123
UN regional group and by time frame. As for the regional regressions, it
seems that the general patterns described above continued to exist, but the
coefficients of polity, freedom of speech, and rule of law were much less

123.

See infra Appendices 3–4.
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statistically significant. Therefore, the “access to justice gap” probably exists more on the macro-level and is less sensitive to smaller differences
within regions.
In addition, there were some interesting trends within the regions themselves. First, in the African region, the coefficients of freedom of speech
and human rights score were negative, and the first coefficient even reached
statistical significance. This means that, in the African context, more communications are actually filed against countries with worse human rights
and political scores. This is an interesting deviation from the very clear pattern seen on the macro-level, where communications are filed against the
more democratic countries. Also, the literacy coefficient reached positive
statistical significance only in the less economically developed regions: Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In the Eastern European and Western regions, it did not reach statistical significance, and it was even negative in the
Western group of countries.
As for the time trends, I looked into three time frames of five years
each: 1997–2002, 2002–2007, and 2007–2012. When divided into different
time frames, the access to justice gap seemed to follow the general trend
with a few interesting exceptions. First, the coefficients on polity and freedom of speech were positive in all time periods, but reached statistical significance only in 1997–2002. All other political and socioeconomic coefficients (human rights score, rule of law, literacy, and GDP) were positive
and statistically significant through all time periods. However, the coefficient of delta year was both negative and statistically significant only in
2007–2012.
I also tried to see whether a change in the human rights score of the
state influenced the number of communications filed against it. For that
purpose, I tested whether the difference in the human rights score of the
state in a given year and the human rights score of the state in the year before that rendered any results. The results were not statistically significant.
In conclusion, the results indicate that there was a clear pattern of people from countries with a good record of human rights, political freedom,
and economic development bringing communications to the HRC. However, those trends were much more evident on the macro-international level
than on the micro-regional level.

2. Representation Before the HRC
As discussed above, a very important aspect of access to justice is
whether people need legal representation in order to bring their case before
the HRC. This is of special importance in the context of the HRC because,
unlike some of the regional human rights systems, the HRC does not have a
litigation fund. In order to assess that, I looked through the relevant decisions and coded whether the applicant was represented. If he was represented, I also coded by whom the applicant was represented. For the cases during the relevant time period, most of the petitioners (58.04%) were
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represented either by an NGO (10.21%) or by a private attorney (46.71%).
However, in 41.96% of the communications, there was no mention of the
applicant being represented.

Figure 2

Representation
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The next question is whether the fact that an applicant is represented
improves his chances of winning a case—meaning that the HRC will find
the communication admissible and that the state violated at least one of the
treaty articles. The following chart demonstrates the number of applicants
who won a case against a state and whether they were represented.

124.
1.13% were classified as other—mainly people whose family members filed petitions in their names.
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Figure 3
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As can be seen from the chart, 51.9% of the applicants who were represented won their case before the HRC, compared to 48.9% of the applicants
who were not represented. This difference is, of course, not statistically sig125
nificant, meaning that, according to these statistics, the HRC is a friendly
forum for people who are not represented and, theoretically, the need for
representation is not necessarily a significant barrier in this regard. However, it should be considered that representation can be important to an individual’s awareness of the possibility of filing a communication with the
HRC.

3. Conclusion of the Quantitative Part
This part looked into two criteria: the global equality of access to justice
and the quantitative data of representation before the HRC. On the criteria
of equality of access to the HRC, the results indicate that, on the macro level, there is a clear pattern of people from countries with a good record of
human rights, political freedom, and economic development bringing communications to the HRC. Regarding legal representation, the descriptive statistics seem to indicate that many people filed communications in the HRC
without being officially represented and that the lack of representation did
not influence the chances of the HRC voting in favor of the applicant.
The quantitative part might also suggest the difficulties potential applicants face, which will be further explored in the interviews. Given that there
are certain barriers that applicants from less democratic and socioeconomically developed countries are more likely to encounter, we can hypothesize
the different reasons for having significantly fewer communications from
those countries. The first possible difficulty is state intimidation for filing

125.

Using a simple chi-squared test.
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communications to the HRC. States that generally violate human rights
probably look less favorably on communications filed against them and may
not hesitate to take measures to prevent potential applicants from shaming
them internationally. It is also likely harder to be aware of the procedure of
individual communications in less democratic countries. This is because it is
less likely to be taught in universities, the press is less likely to report about
decisions against the state, and perhaps people have less access to information in general.
Another interesting (though expected) finding is that the existence of an
alternative tribunal reduces the probability of filing a communication to the
HRC. Therefore, through the interviews, it is important to understand what
brought applicants who chose the HRC over an alternative tribunal to do so.
This can shed light on the relative accessibility of the HRC as compared to
other international institutions and perhaps also provide additional indications about the different motivations for filing communications with the
HRC.
Finally, although it seems that the HRC is quite accessible even without
legal representation, a closer look is needed. This is because the data that I
collected relied only on what was indicated in the decisions of the HRC.
However, if an applicant was actually assisted by a lawyer behind the
scenes, this would not be reflected in the data that I brought.

B. Qualitative Analysis
1. Research Questions
Interviews can assist us in answering questions regarding the motivations of individual applicants for filing individual communications with the
HRC, the difficulties in accessing the HRC, and the interpersonal (subjective) impressions from the process. Taking into account the quantitative
findings, I looked at the following indicators of access to justice. The corresponding question numbers in the questionnaire are in parentheses. The
126
questionnaire can be found in Appendix 5):
(1) Goal of Filing Communications to the HRC:
a.

Did applicants file a communication because they hoped to
receive a remedy or because they wanted to raise national/
international awareness of a certain problem? (Question 6)

b. Did the interviewee believe that the state would implement
the decision? (Question 7)

126.
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How important were different aspects of the communication process to the applicants and their representatives?
(Questions 38–42)

(2) Difficulties with Accessing the HRC:
a.

Availability of information regarding the possibility of filing a communication to the HRC—how did the applicants
and their representatives find out about the possibility of
filing a communication under the OP? (Questions 2, 16–
17)

b. Reasons for choosing the HRC over an alternative tribunal.
(Questions 8–10)
c.

Methods of filing communications—how did the individual
bring the communication to the HRC? Is the process of bringing communications easy and straightforward? (Question 26)
d. Requirement to exhaust domestic remedies—did applicants exhaust domestic remedies before bringing a communication to
the HRC? Do states argue that the HRC lacks jurisdiction on
these grounds? (Questions 3–5)
e. Money and other resources needed for the process—how necessary is it to have legal representation? How expensive is it to
file a communication with the HRC? How many hours of preparation are needed to file a communication? Can an individual
file a communication without professional help? (Questions 15,
19)
f. Persecution by the state—do applicants and their representatives fear persecution by the state? Did the applicants or their
representatives actually experience persecution? (Questions
21–25)
g. Quality of remedy—is the remedy provided by the HRC detailed enough? (Question 31)
h. Hardship in implementing the decision on the domestic level—
was the decision of the HRC implemented by the state? Did the
applicant have to undergo additional national judicial or administrative procedures in order for the HRC decision to be implemented by the state? (Questions 35–36)
i. Other difficulties and concerns raised by the interviewees.
(Questions 27, 32)
(3) Interpersonal (Subjective) Impressions from the Process:
a.

Communication with the UN staff during the process itself—how accessible and responsive is the UN staff to applicants and their representatives? (Question 33)
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b. Fairness of the system—is the process before the HRC
perceived as fair? (Question 34)
c.

Recommending that others bring a communication—do
applicants recommend that others use the individual communication system under the ICCPR? (Question 44)

d. Willingness to file another communication—would the applicants and their representatives consider submitting another communication to the HRC in the future? (Question
46)
e.

Belief in the wider effect of the decision—do the applicants believe that the decision of the HRC in their case had
a wider impact? (Question 37)

2. Data
The qualitative component of the research analyzes interviews with
people who filed and assisted with filing communications to the HRC. I interviewed applicants, private lawyers, and NGOs. I used a semi-structured
interview method: the interviewees were asked both pre-determined questions found in a questionnaire and additional questions about relevant topics
127
that came up during the interview. There were separate questionnaires for
128
applicants and representatives, but most of the questions overlapped.
Overall, 32 people were interviewed via Skype—four applicants, 16 private
lawyers, and 12 NGOs.
The main method of finding the interviewees was through a search on
the internet of the names indicated on the decision of the HRC. I contacted
potential interviewees from decisions given between November 30, 2006 to
February 28, 2016. Since it is much harder to locate people via the internet
in certain countries, four of the interviewees were referred to me by other
129
interviewees (a partial snowball sample). The interviews were conducted
by me both in English and in Russian.
The sample of interviewees might be biased for three main reasons.
First, I could not locate the contact details of many applicants or their representatives, and it could be assumed that people from less developed countries are harder to locate via the internet. Another sample bias, which poses
a problem in most interview research, is that the decision to participate in

127.
University of Chicago IRB approval IRB15-1518.
128.
See infra Appendix 5.
129.
See generally Mark S. Handcock & Krista J. Gile, Comment: On the Concept of
Snowball Sampling, 41 SOC. METHODOLOGY 367 (2011); Douglas D. Heckathorn, Comment:
Snowball Versus Respondent-Driven Sampling, 41 SOC. METHODOLOGY 355 (2011).
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the study was voluntary. Therefore, perhaps certain types of interviewees
were more likely to agree to participate—for instance, people who were
very disappointed with the decision of the HRC, or people who received
precedential decisions in their favor and wanted to talk about their success.
Also, it should be taken into account that I was able to interview only people speaking English or Russian. This might have caused a certain bias by
only highlighting the points of view of people who are proficient in English—who tend to be more educated or come from English-speaking countries—or people from the former communist countries—who are more likely to speak Russian and might have quite specific human rights issues in
their countries. Finally, another problem with the sample of interviewees is
that I only interviewed people who actually filed a communication to the
HRC. Therefore, I might not be able to understand some of the reasons that
preclude people from filing communications in the first place. I tried to partially solve this problem by discussing with interviewees (especially lawyers
and NGOs) the general question of what can be done in order to make the
HRC more accessible. Many of them had long experience promoting human
rights, so they could shed some light on possible difficulties that preclude
people from accessing the HRC in the first place.

3. Results
i. Motivation for Filing Communications
As mentioned at the beginning of the Article, in order to evaluate a judicial or quasi-judicial body, one needs to understand the goal of the institution. This goal should be analyzed from the perspective of all relevant
stakeholders—in this case, the member states, the HRC, and the applicants
themselves. Interviews are the best tool in order to understand the goals of
the applicants.
When asked about the reason for bringing a communication to the
130
HRC, 75% of the interviewees mentioned the belief that the state would
implement the decision of the HRC as the motivation for bringing the communication before the HRC in the first place. While 34.3% of the interviewees mentioned it as the primary motivation for bringing a communication,
40.6% of the interviewees mentioned it as one of the motivations for bringing a communication. On the other hand, 59.3% of the interviewees mentioned the will to bring the human rights violation to the attention of the national/international public as a reason for filing the communication, and
only 18.7% of the interviewees indicated it as the only reason for bringing
the communication to the HRC.
When asked whether they believed that the state would actually imple131
ment the decision of the HRC, 77.4% of the interviewees did believe, to
130.
131.

See infra Appendix 5, p. 72, question 6.
See infra Appendix 5, p. 72, question 7.
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some extent, that the state would eventually implement the decision of the
HRC. However, when asked whether they were aware of the implementa132
tion rate of the decisions of the HRC, only 41.3% of the interviewees answered that they were aware of the implementation rate.
The answers to questions 38–42 also seem to reflect a certain preference for states implementing decisions by the HRC over other aspects of the
process. The interviewees were asked to grade, on a scale of 1 to 5, how important several aspects of the process were for them. When asked how im133
portant it was for the applicant that the state implement the decision, 80%
134
135
of the interviewees indicated “5[.]” In a parallel question, when the representatives were asked how important it was for them that the decision
would be implemented by the state, 67.85% of the interviewees indicated
136
“5[.]” When asked how important it was that the national/international
137
public be aware of the filing of the communication, only 36.6% of people
138
indicated “5” from the point of view of the applicants, and 35.71% indi139
cated “5” from their personal point of view as representatives. Finally,
very similar numbers emerged when interviewees were asked how important it was to them that the national/international public be aware of the
140
decision of the HRC in response to the communication: 40.74% of the in141
terviewees (both applicants and representatives) indicated “5[.]” Therefore, it seems that, at least from the analysis of the numerical answers, there
is a certain preference for the HRC providing a remedy that can be implemented on the national level.
Throughout the answers to different questions in the interviews, a more
complex picture emerged. It seems that, among the interviewees, there were
different perceptions of the role of the decisions under the OP. Some
thought that the role of the decisions was mainly creating unified and clear
international human rights jurisprudence and awareness of human rights
142
problems and not necessarily providing a remedy in a specific case. Others obviously held the opposite view. Also, as reflected in the slight difference in the answers to questions 38–43, there was a difference between the
motivations of the representatives and the motivations of the applicants
themselves. It seems that, to some degree, the applicants tend to be more in-
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See infra Appendix 5, p. 74, question 28.
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terested in the implementation of the decision in their cases, while the representatives (especially NGOs) at times use the cases to develop international
jurisprudence. Representatives sometimes mentioned goals such as “strategic litigation” and promoting jurisprudence on subjects like the death penal143
ty and social and economic rights. One of the interviewees, an experienced human rights lawyer, said that:
[F]irst what we engaged in was sort of strategic litigation, and by
that what I mean is we are trying to actually change something beyond just getting a remedy for the victims. I mean getting a remedy
for the victims is foremost priority for us, but we also try to shape
the norms and try to push some jurisprudence. One of the things we
wanted to do with the Human Rights Committee is sort of expand
their jurisprudence when it comes to certain aspects of social
144
rights.
Interviewees from countries with a problematic human rights record
were many times more realistic about the prospect of implementation by the
145
state. One interviewee revealed that “many applicants know that the decision will not change the reality.” Some mentioned that they hope that if
there were to be more and more decisions against the state on the same sub146
ject, it would eventually have a certain impact. One of the interviewees
even mentioned that the decisions of the HRC might help establish a demo147
cratic regime in his country in the future. He also stated that he printed a
booklet with a summary of the decisions of the HRC against the state and
handed it to state officials. Another interviewee mentioned that the HRC
148
gives people hope against corrupt national legal institutions. Additionally,
some interviewees mentioned that they brought their communications because they wanted their human rights violations to be recorded as “part of
149
history” in the “United Nations official records.”
Interestingly, there is no indication that a historic record of atrocities
was regarded as one of the goals of the individual communications process
by the member states (or even the HRC itself). However, interviewees from
countries where violations of human rights are common saw it as a very important goal. Additionally, it was suggested that the decisions of the HRC
150
might empower marginalized communities. Finally, two of the interview-

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Interviewee ## 5, 11, 12, 22, 24, 26, 27.
Interviewee # 27.
Interviewee # 7.
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Interviewee # 28.
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ees mentioned that they used the process under the OP in order to promote a
151
dialogue with the state and reach a final settlement over a disputed issue.
From the analysis above, it can be concluded that, although the original
goal of the member states was creating non-binding jurisprudence on the
rights granted by the ICCPR, both the HRC and the applicants themselves
increasingly see the individual communications procedure as judicial in nature, granting a remedy that should be implemented on the national level.
Also, whereas human rights lawyers and NGOs see the HRC as a platform
for strategic litigation, some applicants also see it as a forum to tell their story.

ii. Difficulties with Accessing the HRC
One of the major problems with accessing the HRC is probably the
availability of information about filing a communication. When asked about
how they learned about the possibility of filing communications to the
152
HRC, the most common answer was legal education—45% of the interviewees chose that option. 9% of interviewees were informed about the possibility of filing by a lawyer, and the same percentage was informed about
the possibility of filing by an NGO. Other ways of finding out included a
search on the internet and learning from someone else who filed a communication. Another option, which was mentioned by four interviewees, was
courses and seminars organized by different funds to empower and promote
human rights activities in countries with problematic human rights rec153
ords. The impression was that, whereas interviewees from democratic
countries were more likely to learn about the possibility of filing a communication through university education or a search on the internet, other interviewees were more likely to find out about the possibility through networks and seminars. All of the people interviewed who filed
communications without legal help had either legal education or a long history of being human rights activists. Therefore, when one of my interviewees told me that he heard of some “lay people” who filed communications
without professional help, I asked how he thought that they had found out
154
about the possibility. I received the following answer:
I guess it depends. In general, as you know, it’s very unexploited
and unknown, but sometimes I guess they see in the newspaper, for
instance.
...
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Sometimes national press do talk about it and disseminate news
about that, so they see “International expert body . . . Anti-torture
body . . . ” or whatever condemns [a country] for torture in this
case. I guess they also learn about it because they know someone
that did it. It’s true, it’s not very easy, so it’s not an accessible procedure let’s say. It’s not very accessible.
When asked whether they had heard of the HRC prior to the decision to
155
file a communication to the HRC themselves, 87% of the interviewees
mentioned that they knew about the HRC beforehand. Moreover, 68% of
the interviewees mentioned that they had a chance to discuss and consult
156
with other applicants before filing a communication themselves. When
asked to provide information about interactions with others before filing a
communication, interviewees mentioned consulting with human rights lawyers and NGOs about the procedure and strategies of filing communications
157
to the HRC. Also, several interviewees mentioned that they were exposed
to the possibility of filing a communication through networks of lawyers
and NGOs working to promote jurisprudence on a certain subject or to improve the human rights situation in a certain country. These networks were
also mentioned as good platforms for finding out more information about
158
how exactly the process before the HRC works.
Furthermore, from the interviews, it seems that some NGOs have taken
the initiative to make the treaty mechanism much better known. For instance, a handbook published by the World Organization Against Torture
159
provides information about the UN individual communications system.
This handbook has been published in five languages: English, Spanish,
French, Arabic, and Russian. One of the interviewees who works for a big
NGO mentioned a special project that the NGO is leading to promote capacity building in litigation before the UN treaty bodies. This project involves

See infra Appendix 5, p. 73, question 16.
See infra Appendix 5, p. 73, question 17.
Interviewee ## 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19, 20.
Interviewee ## 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 18, 24, 29.
SARAH JOSEPH ET AL., SEEKING REMEDIES FOR TORTURE VICTIMS: A HANDBOOK
ON THE INDIVIDUAL COMPLAINTS PROCEDURES OF THE UN (2d ed. 2014), http://
www.omct.org/files/2014/11/22956/v4_web_onusien_en_omc14.pdf (last visited Oct. 4,
2018); see also Forma Zhaloby, TSENTR STRATEGICHESKOY TYAZHBY [CTR. FOR STRATEGIC
LITIG.],
http://litigation.by/komitet-oon-po-pravam-cheloveka/zhaloba-v-komitet-oon-popravam-cheloveka/forma-zhaloby (last visited Oct. 4, 2018) (explaining how to file a communication to the HRC in Russian); Individual Complaints to the Human Rights Committee,
Claiming Hum. Rts., http://www.claiminghumanrights.org/ccpr_individual_communications.
html (last visited Oct. 4, 2018) (for applicants from African countries); Human Rights Committee: Communication Procedure, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR’S GUIDE TO INT’L HUM. RTS.
SYS.,
http://co-guide.info/mechanism/human-rights-committee-communication-procedure
(last visited Oct. 4, 2018); Human Rights Committee: Individual Complaints, INT’L JUST.
CTR.,
http://www.ijrcenter.org/un-treaty-bodies/human-rights-committee/
RESOURCE
#Individual_Complaints (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
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the NGO itself litigating precedential cases before the HRC on certain subjects and then informing other NGOs about the new jurisprudence on the
160
subject and helping them litigate similar cases.
If a person or his representative is already aware of the possibility of filing a communication to the HRC, it seems that the process is somewhat
more accessible. On the website of the Office of the High Commissioner for
161
Human Rights, there is a special section dedicated to the HRC. This section includes explanations of the process of filing communications in language that is supposed to be understandable to people without a legal education. On the main page of the HRC webpage, it is even possible to find a
model complaint with a checklist of required supporting documents. However, some interviewees mentioned that the online explanation about how to
file a communication should be much more detailed and that a person with162
out a legal education might have trouble understanding it.
163
The HRC webpage also has a section with its recent jurisprudence,
but the ability to search by treaty article or by subject was added only recently. Before that, the relevant jurisprudence was not very accessible even
to lawyers. It should be noted that there are several websites not officially
associated with the UN that have better options for searching for the rele164
vant jurisprudence. Two interviewees indeed raised the problem that the
jurisprudence of the HRC is not very accessible through the website, and it
165
is hard to conduct proper legal research before filing a communication.
Another important question that might help shed light on the accessibility of the HRC is whether an alternative tribunal is available for the claim,
and if so, what was the reason for bringing the communication specifically
to the HRC? When asked whether they believed that an alternative interna166
tional human rights tribunal existed for their claim, 41% of the interviewees answered in the affirmative. Half of those interviewees said that this alternative tribunal was the European Court of Human Rights (the “ECtHR”).
The interviewees were also asked why they preferred the HRC over the al-
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161.
Human Rights Committee: Monitoring Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS
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Interviewee ## 9, 18.
166.
See infra Appendix 5, pp. 72–73, question 8–9.
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167

ternative tribunal, and the answers were very diverse. The reasons for
choosing the HRC over the alternative tribunals can mainly be divided into
two: procedural reasons and reputational reasons. The procedural reasons
mentioned were that the HRC was more efficient than the alternative tribu168
169
nal, it was easier to file a communication there, the process cost less
170
money, it was easier to go through the preliminary screening of admissi171
172
bility, the HRC was more likely to grant interim measures quickly, the
173
HRC had more flexible time frames to file communications, and the applicants were more knowledgeable regarding the procedures before the
174
HRC than before the alternative tribunal. The reputational reasons for filing a communication include: the HRC was more high profile than the al175
ternative tribunal, the HRC was more authoritative and had a stronger
176
177
mandate, the HRC was more open to hearing low-key cases, and the de178
cisions of the HRC were more credible. Finally, one of the interviewees
179
mentioned choosing the HRC because it was part of the UN system.
It seems that the process of filing a communication is quite simple. According to the website of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the
communication can be sent in one of three ways: via email, regular mail, or
180
fax (the latter especially for urgent matters). When asked about the meth181
od of filing a communication to the HRC, there seemed to be no special
preference for either method: one-third of the interviewees indicated that
they filed the communication only via email, and one-third mentioned filing
only via regular mail. 23% said that they filed both by email and by regular
mail, and the rest indicated that they filed via fax. Several interviewees expressed a concern that their countries had (or could have) interfered with
182
regular mail that they wanted to send to the HRC. One interviewee even
167.
See infra Appendix 5, p. 73, question 10.
168.
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169.
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mentioned that he used to send mail to the HRC through a third country because he was afraid that the government monitored the mail services and
183
therefore could have prevented important mail from reaching the HRC.
Another interviewee also mentioned in this regard that written correspondence with the HRC is always opened and read by the government before it
184
reaches its destination.
Another factor that could pose a problem for the accessibility of the
HRC is the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies. As in most other in185
ternational tribunals, applicants are required to exhaust all possible domestic remedies before bringing a communication to the international lev186
el. The question, in this regard, is how closely the tribunal follows this
rule and whether it makes any exceptions to it. The OP itself states in article
5(2)(b) that domestic remedies should not be exhausted when “the applica187
tion of remedies is unreasonably prolonged.” Additionally, according to
the jurisprudence of the HRC, the available remedy should be an “effective”
188
one. Therefore, for states with authoritarian regimes, the HRC is much
more open to hearing cases, even if the applicants did not exhaust all the
189
possible national remedies.
When asked whether domestic courts were impartial in deciding the
190
case, 63% of the interviewees answered that they thought that the domestic courts were not impartial, but rather influenced, to some degree, by the
government. However, all but two of the interviewees actually claimed to
have exhausted all possible domestic remedies before bringing a communi191
cation to the HRC. The two interviewees who said that they did not exhaust domestic remedies explained that the reason for that was the heavy
192
political influence on the courts in those states. When asked about exhaustion of domestic remedies, almost all the interviewees pointed out that they
had no other choice than to go through the whole domestic procedure and
that they did not even consider bringing a communication to the HRC without doing so. This may indicate that this requirement is seen as essential,
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and therefore, potential applicants and their representatives are afraid to take
the risk that their communication will be declared inadmissible, despite the
fact that, in many of the countries, the judicial system is influenced by the
government.
When asked whether the state attempted to argue that the communication was inadmissible on the grounds of lack of exhaustion of domestic
193
remedies, half of the interviewees answered that such a claim was actually
made by the state. However, only five interviewees mentioned exhaustion of
194
domestic remedies as an obstacle to the accessibility of the HRC. One of
them suggested that, perhaps in countries with problematic records, the
195
HRC should not insist on this admissibility criterion. Another interviewee
said that proving the exhaustion of domestic remedies was a real problem
for many people from his country since there is no local culture of docu196
menting all official government actions. Finally, one interviewee mentioned that his NGO sometimes raises money specifically for domestic liti197
gation in order to access the HRC when it is exhausted.
As discussed earlier, money and other resources needed to access a legal institution have long been regarded as one of the most important aspects
of access to justice. Even though the HRC does not have a litigation fund as
some of the regional systems do, the descriptive statistics about representation suggest that the HRC is very accessible. As mentioned above, the applicant was not represented in about 40% of the cases before the HRC.
However, following the interviews, a few doubts may be cast on the authenticity of this number. First of all, among the interviewees who represented
themselves, everyone either had a legal education or was a prominent human rights activist. An interviewee from a country against which many
communications are filed sounded very doubtful that people without legal or
human rights education would be able to file communications by themselves. He told me that, in many cases, even if no representative in a communication against his country was mentioned, he knew the identity of the
198
“shadow representative” in the case. Moreover, when interviewees were
asked whether they helped applicants to file communications without being
199
officially listed as the representatives, 43% answered in the affirmative.
However, another interviewee who works for an NGO said that she did
know a few people who managed communications by themselves from be200
ginning to end.
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The reasons for choosing not to be listed as representatives were diverse. The most common reason was fear of retribution by the state. Some
interviewees mentioned that, whereas they always chose to be mentioned as
the representative (among other reasons, because they thought that they had
an ethical responsibility to do so), they said that they were familiar with
lawyers who chose not to be officially listed as representatives because they
201
feared state retribution. This answer was especially common among lawyers from countries with problematic human rights records. Some representatives did not want their names mentioned in very political cases, and this
was true even for representatives from democratic countries. Others mentioned that they were not always listed officially as a representative because
the applicant did the main work himself, and they only gave general (or spe202
cific) advice. An interviewee also noted that his colleagues sometimes
prefer not to list themselves as the representatives because they believe that
203
the HRC treats unrepresented applicants more favorably. Finally, it was
also noted that sometimes representatives choose not to be officially listed
204
because others have already been listed in that capacity. Therefore, even
though the quantitative part suggested that the HRC was very accessible in
this regard, the interviews revealed that the picture is probably quite different.
205
When asked about payment for assistance in filing a communication,
75% of the interviewees answered that they handled the communication as a
pro bono case and that the applicant did not pay for it. As mentioned, some
interviewees from NGOs noted that they had special fundraising for litigation, since they actually never ask the applicants for money for representation before the HRC. It should be noted in this regard that the fact that so
many of the interviewees said they had not been paid should not necessarily
be taken as representing reality. This is because there is good reason to believe that NGOs and lawyers handling cases pro bono would probably be
more likely to be responsive to an invitation for an interview as compared to
lawyers who were paid regular fees for representation. Regarding the other
options, only three interviewees mentioned that the applicant himself paid
206
for legal services, one said that another NGO paid for the representation,
and two said that the government against which the communication was
207
brought paid the fee. Finally, one of the interviewees refused to disclose
who paid for the representation.
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As for the amount of resources—both time and money invested in the
communications—the answers were very diverse. In general, interviewees
were not very keen to talk about the amount that they paid or were paid for
their work, and some refused to answer the question. Those who agreed to
answer mentioned an amount between $4,500 and $6,800. An interviewee
who represented a case with many applicants said that each applicant paid
him around $115. When asked about the hours that it took to work on the
communication, the answers were very diverse, and it seemed to depend
mainly on how novel the case was, how complex the facts of the case were,
and whether the representative was familiar with the facts of the case from
208
the national proceedings. The answers varied from 15 hours for a “standard” deportation case represented by a lawyer who also represented the applicant in the national proceedings to “hundreds of hours” for a case in
which the NGO wished to set a new precedent for a subject on which the
HRC did not have significant jurisprudence.
The next criterion to be examined is that of persecution and harassment
209
by the state. The persecution and harassment of individuals and groups
cooperating with the UN treaty bodies is a known problem. Therefore, in
July 2015, the chairpersons of the treaty bodies met and wrote the “Guide210
lines against Intimidation and Reprisals (the “San José Guidelines”). People filing individual communications with the HRC are especially prone to
persecution because, according to the OP, anonymous communications are
211
not allowed. Therefore, paragraph 19 of the San José Guidelines reads as
follows:
When it is alleged that an individual or group is at risk of intimidation or reprisals for seeking to communicate or for having communicated with a treaty body, including as a result of filing or of considering or attempting to file a formal complaint to a treaty body in
the framework of the individual communications procedures, the
committee concerned can request the relevant State party to adopt
protection measures for the individual or group concerned. Such
measures can include requests to refrain from any acts of intimidation or reprisals and to adopt all measures necessary to protect
those at risk. The State party may be requested to provide the

208.
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committee, within a specific deadline, with information on
measures taken to comply with the request.
Indeed, persecution was probably the most sensitive topic raised during
the interviews, and, unsurprisingly, many interviewees were hesitant to
speak about their personal experiences. Some were more open to discussing
the experiences of others on this subject, but not their own. This is how one
of the interviewees, who works for an NGO, described the situation in one
of the more problematic countries in this regard:
[T]he government itself and that opposition party and police and
security persons, they try to harass us. They try to make hurdles in
our working moralities. They often . . . now, . . . now there are so
many things. They always harass to that victims, witnesses as well.
These people, they also exaggerate things. They . . . on lies, yeah?
...
They try to manipulate the victims and, “These people are not
working in favor of you.” That, “These people are just like doing
that dollar business, business of dollars. They are just, like, they are
spy of ours.” That, “They are working for that international community and that international people.” Blame is there from one side,
and other side the harassment and psychological torture, and sometimes, threats to the victims and manipulation to the victims. These
are things that commonly happen in [the country]. Yeah.
Another interviewee, a human rights lawyer from a very democratic
country, answered the question about state retribution in this manner:
No, nothing we have detected, but it does operate at a different level. There is a chilling effect, because typically in response to UN
findings, conservative governments like this one routinely come out
and say, “we’re not going to be bullied by bureaucrats in Geneva.
We’re a sovereign country. We get to decide what happens in our
country.” There’s quite a strong negative reaction amongst conservatives in [the country].
...
No, obviously from time to time, senior politicians, ministers, including the Attorney General, come out and say mean things about
me in the media, but I can live with that.
When asked whether the applicant was afraid of harassment or persecu212
tion, 25% of the interviewees answered in the affirmative. It seems that
212.

See infra Appendix 5, p. 73, question 21.

494

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 39:453
213

the representatives were less afraid of harassment or persecution: only
three representatives said that they were. When asked why the applicant or
214
the representative was afraid of persecution or harassment, the most
common answers were either that they personally experienced it in the past
for being involved in human rights activities or because it was widely
known that the government mistreated human rights activists. Two interviewees also observed that their main fear was not for themselves but for
their families. Some of the interviewees mentioned that they were not afraid
of persecution and harassment only because they were already used to those
from being human rights activists. Also, several interviewees mentioned
that they knew people who chose not to file communications because they
feared state persecution. Finally, some of the representatives (mainly
NGOs) said that they were not afraid of state persecution because they
worked in different countries than the country against which communication
was filed.
When asked whether the applicant or the representative actually experi215
enced persecution or harassment, one-third of the interviewees answered
in the affirmative. There were several ways in which interviewees were persecuted or knew about others being persecuted following the filing of a
216
communication with the HRC. First, applicants were summoned repeatedly to the local police for questioning, and police searches were conducted in
their homes. Additionally, several interviewees had criminal proceedings
initiated against them for false allegations, and steps like disbarring the lawyer in the case were taken. One interviewee was arrested without trial (administrative arrest) following the initiation of proceedings before the HRC.
Another form of harassment mentioned was constantly asking the person to
file taxes, even if he was under no legal obligation to do so. It was also noted that sometimes police and government officials try to persuade people
and their families not to file or to withdraw communications and that people
were harassed even at their workplaces.
Another form of harassment mentioned was government officials trying
to make the applicants sign statements which contradicted their claims in
the communications. Some of the representatives even said that, at times,
they worked to convince the applicants not to withdraw their communications following state persecution. It is likely that certain groups are more
prone to the fear of harassment than others—for instance, one interviewee
mentioned that he knew a gay person who was afraid of bringing a communication regarding discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in a
country which is very conservative on those issues. In another case that involved minority rights, a minority who was already discriminated against

213.
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was afraid that the discrimination would increase following the filing of the
communication. Finally, in death penalty cases, there was a fear that the
state would implement the sentence faster before a final decision by the
HRC.
Sometimes harassment also takes a “public” form—some interviewees
mentioned that they were portrayed by politicians and by the local media as
“traitors” who damaged the national interest by bringing their problems to
international institutions. One of the strategies for avoiding harassment was
keeping the filing of the communication secret. In those cases, the government found out about it only after it was officially required to submit a response by the HRC, and the chances of persecution were lower.
Whereas one interviewee mentioned that the harassment measures by
the government were severe but not life-threatening, another interviewee
said that the authorities sent him actual death threats. An additional interviewee even mentioned that he had to flee the country because the state persecuted him for bringing cases to international institutions, including a
communication before the HRC. An interviewee also observed that, in one
of the cases he presented before the HRC, the applicant decided eventually
not to ask for implementation of the decision on the national level because
he was afraid of persecution.
The next criteria of access to justice is the quality of the remedy provided by the HRC. The common practice of the HRC currently is to indicate
both a specific remedy for the applicant in the communication and general
measures that the state needs to undertake in order to ensure that the viola217
tion does not occur again. Among the remedies that the HRC has prescribed in recent years are a general “effective remedy” as well as more
218
219
specific remedies such as adequate compensation, public apology,
220
221
222
commutation of the death sentence, retrial, effective investigation,
and prosecution of individuals who allegedly violated the human rights of
223
the applicant. Unlike some other international tribunals, the HRC never
indicates the amount of the compensation which should be paid to the appli224
cant, but leaves it de facto to the state itself to determine.
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225

When asked about the remedy that they received, the interviewees indeed indicated all the remedies mentioned above. Although the HRC is of226
ten criticized for not providing detailed enough remedies, 72% of the interviewees stated that the remedies mentioned in the decision of the HRC
227
were detailed enough. However, some interviewees answered the question
in the affirmative with reservations: for instance, one of the interviewees
mentioned that the remedies were detailed enough only because the re228
spondent country was one with a good human rights record. Another interviewee answered that, while in this case the remedies were detailed, in
other cases he presented before the HRC, the remedies were not detailed
229
enough.
Among those who answered that the remedy was not detailed enough,
the following reasons were offered. First, the HRC did not elaborate enough
as to how the administrative procedures and laws which were the subject of
230
the communication should be amended. Two other interviewees complained that, although it was absolutely clear that the legislation should be
changed so that the country would not be in violation of the ICCPR, the
231
HRC avoided saying that in a straightforward manner. Some interviewees
also mentioned the lack of indication of the amount of compensation as a
232
major problem with the remedy given. It was suggested that leaving the
determination of the exact amount to the respondent state made it easier for
233
the state to avoid implementing the decision. Finally, one interviewee
mentioned that some of the unclearness in the remedy was resolved during
234
the follow-up procedure with the special rapporteur.
Since the state eventually has to implement the decision of the HRC, a
very important criterion is the difficulty in implementing the decision on the
domestic level. As mentioned above, there is a debate regarding the normative status of the decisions under the OP. Therefore, perhaps unsurprisingly,
according to the report of the Open Society, only slightly more than 12% of
235
the HRC decisions under the OP have been fully implemented. When
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236

asked whether the decision was implemented by the state, only two of the
23 interviewees answered that the decision was indeed fully implemented
237
by the respondent state. 57% of the interviewees answered that the decision was not implemented, and 35% answered that there was partial implementation.
When interviewees who indicated partial implementation were asked to
elaborate, they answered that, in some cases, the states did try to “remedy”
the damage caused to the specific victim by paying the applicant monetary
compensation, but it did not amend the wider legislative framework to pre238
vent future violations. In other cases, even the damage caused to the applicant himself was not fully remedied. In one case, the applicant was extradited, contrary to the decision of the HRC, but the state showed willingness
239
to give monetary compensation. In another case, the applicant was re240
leased from custody but did not receive compensation. Also, one interviewee mentioned that the law was amended only in order to remedy the
241
specific violation to the applicant. Another interviewee mentioned that the
state agreed to grant the applicant retrial regarding his application for asylum, but eventually, contrary to the decision of the HRC, did not grant him
242
asylum. Finally, sadly, in one case, the interviewee mentioned that the
state did not wait for the final decision of the HRC and executed the appli243
cant, and in another case, the applicant was deported before the HRC
244
reached a decision on his application.
An additional and important element of implementation at the domestic
level is whether the applicant has to undergo additional proceedings on the
national level or whether the decision is implemented automatically by the
state. When asked about this (question 36), 58% of the interviewees said
that they had to undergo additional proceedings in order for the state to implement the decision of the HRC. The rest of the interviewees said that they
did not have to initiate additional proceedings on the national level. In this
regard, one of the interviewees from a state against which many communications to the HRC are filed mentioned that a group of human rights activists and lawyers are trying to promote legislation that would indicate exactly
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how decisions should be implemented on the national level since it is cur245
rently unclear.
Finally, I asked interviewees about other difficulties and concerns that
they had about the process before the HRC (questions 27 and 32). The main
concern that was raised by no less than 20 interviewees was the time that it
246
takes the HRC to process a communication and to reach a final decision.
As noted above, the average time between the registration and a final deci247
sion on the case was three and a half years. One interviewee observed that
procedures are too prolonged because the secretariat does not insist on time
248
frames with states:
A few things which came up which were really frustrating along
the way. One was that the Committee provides time frames within
which the state must respond to the committee. [the state] routinely
ignores those time frames, whether it’s 3 months or 6 months, depending on the phase, they’re different. Those are firmly written in
the rules. When we complained about that, that [the state] was routinely late, and by late I don’t just mean weeks or days, I mean in
one case a year later, so there’s a guy sitting in detention and yet
you’re waiting up to a year for the government to respond to your
submission. The Committee doesn’t do anything about it. The
Committee might send a little letter to the state reminding them or
something, or they might not. We never really know, because they
don’t really tell us. There’s no serious pressure brought by the
Committee. The Committee just cops it. They just accept that governments can accept whenever they like. That’s pretty frustrating,
because what’s the point of rules of procedure if they don’t mean
anything?
On the other hand, other interviewees said that the procedure before the
249
HRC was faster than expected.
250
Another significant problem mentioned was a language barrier. The
UN has six official languages (English, French, Spanish, Russian, Arabic,
251
and Chinese), and a communication can be filed only in one of those languages. Therefore, interviewees indicated that, when the language of the
state was not one of the six official languages, it was at times burdensome to
245.
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High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Strengthening the United Nations Human Rights
Treaty Body System, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/66/860 (June 26, 2012).
248.
Interviewee # 20.
249.
Interviewee ## 8, 18, 19, 20, 25, 31, 33.
250.
Interviewee ## 4, 8, 22, 26.
251.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), DEP’T FOR GEN. ASSEMBLY & CONF. MGMT.,
http://www.un.org/depts/DGACM/faqs.shtml (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
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translate all the documents into one of those languages. In this regard, one
of the interviewees said that the ECtHR might be better for applicants if
they were found under its jurisdiction, since it is possible to file a communi252
cation there in the language of the country. One of the interviewees mentioned that if they filed the communication in English, the cost of translation
to the language of the respondent state many times falls on the shoulders of
the applicants themselves. This is because the secretariat does not have suf253
ficient resources to do it on its own. Another interviewee said that even
though Arabic is an official UN language, there is still a preference for fil254
ing a communication in English.
Finally, some interviewees found the inability of the HRC to hold oral
hearings and reevaluate facts to be a significant barrier to the accessibility of
255
justice. It was also mentioned by some that the process is complicated and
256
unclear, making it very hard to plan litigation in a strategic way.

iii. Interpersonal Impressions from the Process
Regarding communication with the UN staff during the process, there
seemed to be a spectrum of opinions. When asked whether the secretariat
257
kept the interviewees updated about the progress of the communication,
half of the interviewees answered in the affirmative. However, in the more
258
open questions, many of the interviewees were much more critical of the
way in which the secretariat operates. One interviewee, a lawyer, described
259
his experience as follows:
In this particular case, I do remember that in the beginning they lost
the file, so we had to, after some months, because we were following up with them, because we hadn’t gotten an acknowledgement
letter, because usually you get a letter in about a month saying,
“Thank you for your communication, blah, blah, blah,” and they
didn’t give us that. We had to chase them up for months, and then
they finally said that they lost the file, they admitted receiving it,
and then said that it had been misplaced. We actually had to send
them another one, and I remember at the time that my client was
quite upset about that, because he was hoping that they would help
him. He was saying that he was wrongfully in prison, and obviously he wanted a quick process, as quick as possible, so literally some

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Interviewee # 4.
Interviewee # 26.
Interviewee # 7.
Interviewee ## 10, 13, 17, 23.
Interviewee ## 12, 20.
See infra Appendix 5, p. 74, question 33.
See infra Appendix 5, p. 74, question 27, 32.
Interviewee # 5.
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months were wasted just because they lost the files. He was quite
disappointed in that, obviously.
The most common complaints were that the secretariat was inefficient,
260
lacking resources, unprofessional, and understaffed. It seems that all the
other complaints about the secretariat stemmed from these problems. For
instance, it was mentioned that it was hard to reach the secretariat in order
to ask questions (especially regarding the progress of the communication)
261
and that the staff was not very responsive, even to emails. Some interviewees mentioned that, at times, the secretariat did not respond to emails at
262
all. Another interviewee said that, whereas the secretariat was responsive
to emails, it agreed to provide only very basic and general information re263
garding the case. It was also mentioned that the secretariat did not
acknowledge the receipt of a communication or other documents, that it was
unclear how much time it would take for the secretariat to register the claim,
and that it was hard to find out whether the communication was registered at
264
265
all. Another interviewee complained about loss of documents.
As for the more substantive work of the secretariat, the interviewees
said that the decisions of the secretariat were arbitrary and not comprehensive. Interviewees also mentioned that, many times, it seemed that the secretariat did not read the material sent to it because there were factual mistakes
in the documents that it sent back. For instance, the secretariat claimed that
a certain document was not provided when in fact it was. It was also mentioned that the documents sent by the secretariat discussed irrelevant
266
points. Finally, interviewees said that the secretariat did not on its own
initiative follow up on whether the state sent an answer to the communication—at all or within the time frame prescribed—and that sometimes the
267
interviewees themselves had to remind the secretariat about this.
Even though there seemed to be some discontent with the way in which
the secretariat operated, when it came to the question of the fairness of the
268
process itself, 83% of the interviewees regarded the process before the
HRC as fair. Among the reasons the interviewees listed as undermining the
fairness of the process were a lack of transparency, lack of information from
the secretariat, and lack of a “personal touch” in handling communica269
tions. It was also mentioned that the legal reasoning of the HRC was un260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Interviewee ## 2, 5, 6, 7, 16, 26.
Interviewee ## 16, 17, 22, 23.
Interviewee # 2.
Interviewee # 10.
Interviewee ## 3, 22, 23.
Interviewee # 5.
Interviewee ## 5, 14, 20, 22.
Interviewee ## 7, 20, 32.
See infra Appendix 5, p. 74, question 34.
Interviewee ## 5, 17, 22, 31.
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clear and that the decisions seemed arbitrary. One interviewee thought
271
that the decisions were influenced by politics. Finally, another interviewee
mentioned that he never got a chance to see the answer of the state to the
communication and therefore was not given a proper chance to write a re272
sponse to it.
Even though, from the previous questions, it seems that the interviewees thought that there were significant flaws with the individual communications system, when asked whether they would encourage other people to
273
file communications, 93.5% of the interviewees answered in the affirmative. The same percentage of interviewees also stated that they would consider filing another communication with the HRC themselves in the fu274
ture.
When asked to give a reason why they would recommend others to
bring a communication to the HRC, the main, and perhaps obvious, reason
was that the decisions of the HRC could be implemented by the state now or
in the future and perhaps influence the way in which the state acts in similar
275
cases. One of the interviewees even mentioned that, the more cases there
were against a state, the higher were the chances that the state would even276
tually implement the decisions of the HRC. An additional reason that
many interviewees mentioned was that it is beneficial to have access to an
independent international body monitoring the implementation of the
277
ICCPR. It was also suggested that the HRC is less political than other na278
279
tional and international institutions and faster than the regional systems.
Another category of answers was that filing communications to the HRC
280
raised awareness of human rights violations, documented and recognized
281
human rights violations, and allowed people to insist on their legal rights
282
against the violating state. Several applicants even mentioned that they
283
actively encouraged other lawyers and NGOs to file communications, and
one even runs a special program that trains lawyers and NGOs how to file
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272.
273.
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275.
276.
277.
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279.
280.
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283.

Interviewee ## 5, 22.
Interviewee # 12.
Interviewee # 31.
See infra Appendix 5, p. 75, question 44.
See infra Appendix 5, p. 75, question 46.
Interviewee ## 2, 14, 19, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28.
Interviewee # 3.
Interviewee ## 5, 8, 9, 10, 18, 29.
Interviewee # 10.
Interviewee # 29.
Interviewee ## 1, 2, 8, 20.
Interviewee ## 2, 7, 11, 16.
Interviewee # 17.
Interviewee ## 3, 11, 13.
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284

communications to the HRC. Finally, several interviewees mentioned that
filing communications with the HRC was important in order to develop the
285
jurisprudence of international human rights law.
On the other hand, some interviewees said that they would recommend
filing a communication to the HRC only if there were no other forums in
286
which to bring the case. Additionally, two of the interviewees said that
they would not recommend filing a communication with the HRC because
the decisions of the HRC are not implemented by states. When the interviewees were asked why they would prefer not to file communications to
287
the HRC in the future, the reasons were lack of implementation and that
filing communications that were not implemented by the state harms the
288
reputation and credibility of the NGO.
The interviewees were also asked whether they believed that the deci289
sion in their case had an impact beyond the specific case. 74% answered
that they believed that the decision in their case did have a wider impact.
The reasons for that varied. Some interviewees believed that the decision
influences, or might influence in the future, the behavior of the authorities in
290
their countries. Some also mentioned that it empowers other people from
291
their state to insist on their human rights in various situations. Others suggested that the impact was more international, like development of jurispru292
dence on a certain subject or drawing international attention to a prob293
lem.
Also, two interviewees spoke in terms of “empowerment of
294
295
marginalized people” and “giving hope.”

V. Discussion of the Findings and
Suggestions for Possible Reforms
This part evaluates the success of access to justice under the OP from
the perspective of the three main stakeholders—the member states, the
HRC, and the applicants. Additionally, it suggests ways to make the HRC
more accessible in light of the empirical findings of this study and the suggestions of previous literature about access to justice. I also include relevant

284.
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287.
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Interviewee # 11.
Interviewee ## 1, 16, 18.
Interviewee ## 15, 17, 18.
See infra Appendix 5, p. 75, question 46.
Interviewee # 12, 30.
See infra Appendix 5, pp. 74–75, question 37.
Interviewee ## 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 14, 22, 23, 24.
Interviewee ## 2, 12, 13, 23.
Interviewee ## 6, 12, 16, 18, 20, 27, 31, 32.
Interviewee ## 13, 14, 20.
Interviewee # 29.
Interviewee # 28.
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296

suggestions from interviewees. It should also be noted that, in 2012, the
High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a report on strengthening the
297
UN human rights treaty body system. Although the discussion in the current Article is limited to specific reforms in the context of individual communications in the HRC, I provide references to the relevant pages in the
Report in the footnotes.

A. Universality and Equality of Access to the HRC
When we examine the universality and equality of access to the HRC
criterion, there seems to be a significant problem with the system. This criterion is of special importance since, as mentioned in the Preamble of the
ICCPR and the OP, it seems that a main goal of the individual communications procedure was universal implementation of human rights. As was evident from the quantitative part of this study, the system probably fails in this
regard. The low number of communications brought, as well as the fact that
they are mainly filed against states that have a strong political and socioeconomic background, speaks for itself. It seems fair to say that the system is
very much underused and could reach many more people. This is especially
disappointing since, as it is today, the entire procedure takes place in writing
without oral hearings, and therefore, geographical distance from Geneva
should not be an obstacle. Also, given that access to international institutions is seen as an important tool for promoting marginalized people and
communities, it is troublesome that people from non-democratic and less
socioeconomically developed countries, who might be the ones who need
the most to bring their story before an international institution, are the ones
who have the least access to it.
The finding that access to the HRC is not distributed equally among different types of countries should be seen as problematic regardless of whether the role of the system is to grant a remedy implemented on the national
level, provide general guidelines for member states, or just offer a platform
for victims to tell their story. It might be assumed that people under the jurisdiction of states that are democratic and socioeconomically developed
bring different types of communications to the HRC than do people under
the jurisdiction of poor and authoritarian states. Even if one rejects the role
of the HRC as providing a remedy in a specific case, there is a general significance in having applicants from different backgrounds bring communi-

296.
See infra Appendix 5, p. 75, question 45.
297.
See High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., supra note 247 (discussing a wide reform of the
treaty system, including a proposal to unify the treaty bodies); see also Shany, The Effectiveness of the Human Rights Committee and the Treaty Bodies Reform, supra note 81 (providing
a critique and a discussion of the Report); Anthony J. Ellis, Developing Human Rights Before
the United Nations Human Rights Committee and in New Zealand Courts: A Practitioner’s
Perspective 221–27 (2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, La Trobe University, 2014) (on
file with the author of this Article) (arguing that, in the context of New Zealand, the main
problems are lack of awareness, education, resources and political will).
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cations of various subject matters before the HRC to establish a diverse jurisprudence answering many needs. Moreover, there is a special significance in giving people from states with poor human rights record a platform
to tell their stories to an international body.
However, there is serious doubt as to whether the system as it is today
is even capable of handling more individual communications. As it currently stands, with less than 150 decisions on individual communications each
year, the average time period for a decision is three and a half years. Even
with this small number of communications (relative to the potential), the
impression from the interviews is that both the secretariat and the HRC itself have substantial difficulty keeping up with the pace. Therefore, any attempt to make the HRC more accessible will have to take into account that
the resources provided to the HRC need to be increased significantly as
298
well—mainly more staff and more financial resources.
A more cynical perspective on the situation might suggest that countries
with problematic human rights records, which are also stakeholders for this
purpose, could be satisfied with the situation. On the one hand, they have
the international prestige of being signatories to the OP, but on the other
hand, the HRC is not sufficiently accessible to applicants from those countries. Therefore, those countries do not pay a price for their actual human
rights violations. Such a “misuse” of the system should not be regarded as a
legitimate interest of a stakeholder according to the rules of interpretation
299
provided in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. However,
around 60% of the HRC budget comes from voluntary contributions from
300
member states, and providing the HRC with more resources very much
depends on the will of member states. Therefore, this hidden interest of
some states in making the HRC inefficient might create a lack of political
will to actually change the situation and give the HRC more funding. It
should be noted that, whereas most of the suggestions to follow indeed demand a significant addition to the budget, some of them might not be as expensive and hence are perhaps more realistic in the short term.

298.
See also High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., supra note 247, at 71–72 (recommending
that the Committees encourage friendly settlements within the individual communications
procedures).
299.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith”); see also Shany, The Effectiveness of the Human Rights
Committee and the Treaty Bodies Reform, supra note 81, at 1327–29 (discussing “what appears to be a conscious decision by a significant number of state-parties to maintain the treaty
bodies under permanent conditions of under-effectiveness” and criticizing the High Commissioner for failing to acknowledge this problem).
300.
Latest Voluntary Contributions to OHCHR in 2018, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS.
OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/FundingBudget.aspx
(last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
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B. Difficulties in Accessing the HRC
The interviews with people who filed communications to the HRC revealed quite significant difficulties in accessing the HRC. Unsurprisingly,
the most troubling issue discussed was persecution and harassment by the
state. This issue can also explain why we see fewer communications from
states with problematic human rights records. There is no “magic solution”
to this problem since it is very much entwined with the difficulty of making
states comply with their general human rights obligations. However, the San
José Guidelines are a good starting point since they acknowledge that such a
problem indeed exists, and they identify possible ways to fight it. First, the
Guidelines suggest that the Committees nominate a committee member to
301
serve as a rapporteur or focal point for reprisals. The main role of those
special rapporteurs is to be the address for complaints of state reprisals
against individuals and organizations and to determine the appropriate
302
course of action. The rapporteur should also compile information on good
303
practices relating to protective approaches. The treaty body itself is also
304
encouraged to adopt protective measures in the appropriate situations and
to raise awareness among member states of the importance of cooperation
305
regarding intimidation or reprisals.
It should be noted, however, that it is necessary for the applicants to
know about the existence of the special rapporteur, as well as to have an
ability to access the rapporteur and receive a fast answer. From a search
conducted on the internet in May 2016, it was unclear whether a special
rapporteur was indeed appointed and how he or she could be contacted. This
is a very acute concern since timeliness is crucial for state reprisals that
could possibly be life-threatening.
On the more optimistic side, 58 countries joined a statement read at the
session of the Human Rights Council about preventing reprisals toward
306
those who cooperate or seek to cooperate with the UN. However, given
that 115 states are parties to the OP, and that many of the states against
which communications are often filed decided not to join the statement—
most noticeably Belarus, Russia, and Uzbekistan—there is cause for concern.
Another important point was awareness of the existence of the individual communications mechanism. When interviewees were asked what
should be done to increase the accessibility of the HRC, the most common

San José Guidelines, supra note 210, ¶¶ 8–14.
Id. ¶¶ 12–14.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id. ¶ 20.
U.S. Joins HRC Joint Statement on Preventing Reprisals, MISSION OF THE UNITED
STATES GENEVA SWITZ., https://geneva.usmission.gov/2015/09/25/u-s-joins-hrc-jointstatement-on-preventing-reprisals/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
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answer was raising awareness of the possibility to file a communication to
307
the HRC. There are several actors that can probably be helpful in that regard: the HRC itself, the secretariat, states, and NGOs. Since 2012, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has attempted to make the
procedures under the UN treaty bodies (including the HRC) better known.
The efforts have mainly focused on creating a mailing list and improving
308
the website. However, much more could be done in this regard, and the
secretariat could be much more active in providing information through the
internet about the possibility and procedures of filing communications. For
instance, the secretariat can improve the quality of information on the HRC
webpage. The secretariat can also be much more active in reaching out to
NGOs and encouraging them to notify potential applicants about the possibility of bringing communications under the OP through their activities and
websites. As for the HRC itself, it can demand that countries, as part of their
bona fide compliance with treaty obligations, take appropriate steps to notify people under their jurisdictions about the possibility of filing communications against them. The HRC can examine compliance with this obligation
within the framework of the periodic state review, and it can also require
states to publish decisions to which they were parties in official state records. These steps do not require too many resources, but they can be very
effective.
As for the states themselves, they can promote awareness through various channels, including through the media, educational programs in law
faculties, and local legal bars. NGOs can take the initiative to post more information about individual communications on their websites (as some have
already done) and make other NGOs in their networks aware of the OP procedure. Finally, since the main problem is that there are not enough communications from non-democratic countries, perhaps the efforts (especially
those of the HRC and NGOs) should be focused on countries from which
communications are not filed very often. In this regard, the simplest thing
would be to translate materials into local languages. Currently, on the UN
website, materials are displayed only in the six official UN languages, and a
one-time effort of the HRC and some NGOs to translate it into more languages could be very useful.
I do not think that there ought to be a competition between the HRC and
the regional tribunals as to who gets to adjudicate the case. This is because
the regional tribunals have larger budgets and probably more political power
to make states implement their decisions (especially the ECtHR). The most
important thing is that a person receives a remedy for a human rights violation committed by the state. There need not be a preference for it to be
granted by the ICCPR and the HRC.

307.
308.

Interviewee ## 1, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 25, 28, 29.
See also High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., supra note 247, at 89–94.
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Two other significant concerns raised regarding the process were the
309
time that it takes to receive a final decision in the communication and language barriers—that a communication can be brought only in one of the six
310
official languages of the UN. As was reflected in the interviews, it is no
secret that the secretariat is very understaffed due to budgetary problems,
and that even the committee members are often assisted by interns who do
not receive money from the UN. Although some procedures might be made
more efficient, it is hard to see how the procedure can be made much faster
without a larger budget. The same is true for the ability to bring a communication in additional languages—it is hard to see how to enable this without
budgeting for more translators into languages that are not the official UN
languages.
Some other difficulties with access to the HRC might be more easily
addressed. For instance, it seems that the HRC is open and accessible to receiving communications filed in different ways (email, regular mail, and
fax). However, the ability to fill out a form online and attach the relevant
311
documents might make it even more accessible. This would also make the
HRC more accessible to people without legal representation.
As for the legal representation itself, although in about 40% of the cases
it was not indicated that the applicant was represented, the reality, as reflected in the interviews, might be quite different. It is hard to tell whether
the reason that applicants tend to be represented is because the legal representative informs them about the possibility to file communications with the
HRC in the first place, or because potential applicants have trouble with the
procedure of filing communications and feel that they are in need of legal
assistance. However, at least from the interviews, it seems that filing a
communication is not a significant financial burden and that many lawyers
and NGOs are ready to do this work pro bono. Therefore, perhaps from this
perspective once again, NGOs and even international law clinics at law
schools should focus more on offering legal assistance in countries where
information about the HRC is less accessible. Another suggestion for increasing accessibility to the HRC is to make the states responsible for financing legal aid to people who wish to file communications against them
in the HRC, or at least do so if the case is decided to be admissible by the
HRC.
As for the question of exhaustion of domestic remedies, the international legal system is probably not ready to grant access to international institutions without the exhaustion of domestic remedies. As discussed, the reason
for that is that, under the current framework of international law, the state is
the primary enforcer of human rights. This is a doctrine adopted both by the
HRC as well as by the regional systems. Although perhaps local courts can-

309.
310.
311.

Interviewee ## 2, 3, 20, 23, 24.
Interviewee ## 4, 7, 8.
Interviewee # 24.
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not always be trusted to be impartial, most of the applicants exhaust domestic remedies, and throughout the interviews, many showed understanding of
the rationale behind this requirement. It also seems that, through its jurisprudence, the HRC does a good job of addressing cases in which exhaustion
of domestic remedies is futile and prevents states from using this requirement unfairly. However, in cases against states that have a problematic human rights record, perhaps the HRC should be even more open to hearing
312
communications, even if not all local remedies have been exhausted.
When it comes to the criterion of the quality of the remedy, the major
problem seems to be that the HRC does not indicate the exact amount of
compensation. This is unlike the practice of other regional courts, and it
gives the states more margin not to comply with the decision. Although it is
true that it is hard to calculate the exact remedy and take into account the
specific economic conditions in 115 states, the HRC should nevertheless
313
make more efforts in this regard. For instance, it can ask both the applicant and the respondent state to give a certain estimation of the amount that
should be paid as compensation and then decide. This is of special importance if the HRC wants to be regarded more as a court and to insist that
314
its decisions should be binding upon states. Also, not indicating an exact
remedy can be an additional excuse on behalf of member states not to implement a decision.
Finally, there seems to be significant difficulty in implementing decisions at the national level. This was evident both from the data of the Open
Society report about implementation and from the answers of interviewees
to the relevant questions. Some of the difficulty might be due to the debate
on the normative status of the decisions under the OP, but it is likely that
many states simply lack the political will to implement those decisions and
do not give them due consideration. Even though some interviewees mentioned that they brought a communication for the symbolic significance, in
75% of the cases, the applicants still mentioned implementation as a motivation for filing a communication. Also, the HRC itself has been actively
promoting implementation in recent years. Therefore, whereas perhaps it
can be argued that certain states want to see the decisions as mere recommendations, the HRC and the applicants, who are the other major stakeholders, see it as a very important part of the process.

312.
Interviewee # 13.
313.
Interviewee ## 14, 26.
314.
Interviewee ## 3, 14, 18; see also High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., supra note 247, at
70 (suggesting that “[t]o the extent possible, remedies should be framed in a way that allows
their implementation to be measured and should be prescriptive.” The High Commissioner
also recommended to “include in final decisions on the merits, to the extent possible, not only
specific and targeted remedies for the victim in question but also general recommendations in
order to ensure the non-repetition of similar violations in the future, such as changes in law or
practice.”).
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There is no easy solution to the problem of the lack of implementation
of the decisions by member states. The HRC already has a special rapporteur for follow-up on communications, and states are required to report on
the status of the implementation of decisions. Also, the HRC itself inquires
of State parties during the periodical review whether and why its decisions
315
on individual communications have not been implemented. Perhaps in this
regard the HRC can increase the pressure on states to comply with its decisions—mainly through more frequent enquiries by the special rapporteur.
Another possibility is to raise the lack of implementation in other international forums that might create diplomatic pressure (like the Universal Periodic Review in the Human Rights Council). In this regard, NGOs can also
be more proactive and run campaigns naming and shaming states that do not
comply with the decisions of the HRC. Finally, in many cases, it is also unclear what the national procedure for implementing the decisions of the
HRC is. Perhaps a possible solution to this problem is to demand that countries which are parties to the OP publish clear guidelines on how a decision
will be implemented.

C. Interpersonal Impressions from the Process
Although the major complaint of this criterion regarded the way in
which the secretariat operated, there is room to be more optimistic on other
issues. As for the communication with the UN staff during the process,
many complained that the secretariat was not responsive enough (or at all)
316
to applicants. It should be noted that the Author of this Article also experienced difficulties in contacting UN staff while trying to obtain information
through emails. I will not repeat the discussion about the budgetary problems, although increasing the secretariat’s budget is obviously the best solution to this situation. However, since many of the questions addressed to the
secretariat by the applicants and their representatives were about the status

315.
See, e.g., U.N. HRC, Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of
Canada, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CAN/CO/6 (Aug. 13, 2015) (“The Committee is concerned
about the State party’s reluctance to comply with all of the Committee’s Views and Interim
Measures under the Covenant and under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (First Optional Protocol), in particular when they relate to recommendations to reopen Humanitarian and Compassionate applications. The Committee regrets the lack of an appropriate mechanism in the State party to implement Views of the
Committee, with a view, inter alia, to providing victims with effective remedies (art. 2)”);
U.N. HRC, Concluding Observations of Its Ninety-Fifth Session: Australia, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/AUS/CO/5 (May 7, 2009) (“While acknowledging the measures taken by the State
party to reduce the likelihood of future communications regarding issues raised in certain of
its Views, the Committee expresses once again its concern at the State party’s restrictive interpretation of, and failure to fulfil its obligations under the First Optional Protocol and the
Covenant, and at the fact that victims have not received reparation.”).
316.
Interviewee ## 3, 5, 11, 16, 17, 20, 23.
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of the communication, two of the interviewees suggested a simple method
317
of online status check.
As for the other criteria, there is more room for optimism. The system
itself is perceived as fair, and almost three-quarters of the interviewees even
thought that their case had a wider impact. Moreover, even though interviewees saw many flaws with the procedures of the system, it was striking
to discover that 93.5% would consider filing a communication themselves
or recommend that others do so.

D. General Evaluation of the OP
When the interviewees were asked to evaluate their satisfaction with the
318
process under the OP on a scale of 1 to 5, the average grade given was
3.65. This middle-of-the-scale number probably best captures the success of
the system under the OP—not an entire success, but not an entire failure either. As one of the interviewees who has been working for an NGO for a
319
long time put it:
I think that the committee and communications process can be extremely useful but it needs to be recognized for what it is . . . . You
see this as a higher hierarchical legal process in the way that we
within [the country] would see, for example, our upper courts. Then
it is failure. That’s not what that process is. I think in terms of
bringing attention to issues and raising those issues and having a
formal record of breeches that have happened and an assessment of
what needs to be done in order to rectify those. In a framework,
which the human rights framework is, of consensus . . . I think that
they’ve played a very, very valuable role.
The finding that only 12% of the decisions of the HRC under the OP are
implemented, as well as the low usage rate of the system, are often cited by
the critics of the HRC as proof of the failure of the system. To this, it should
probably be added that, as demonstrated in the current research, most of the
communications come from countries with good political and socioeconomic conditions. Given that, according to the texts of the ICCPR and the OP,
universality is seen as a goal, and given that the HRC and the interviewees
aim for the implementation of the decisions, the system might be regarded
somewhat as a failure. As was demonstrated, the procedures before the
HRC also suffer from acute problems, many of which derive from the low
budget of the treaty body system. Moreover, the problem of state retribution
probably prevents many communications from even being brought to the
HRC in the first place.

317.
318.
319.

Interviewee ## 18, 23.
See infra Appendix 5, p. 75, question 47.
Interviewee # 16.
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However, implementation and universality are not the only goals of the
system. It seems that the procedure under the OP is also seen by some as a
way to raise awareness of certain problems in a country and gives certain
tools to promote change in member states in the future. Also, one should not
underestimate the importance of the ability of a person whose human rights
were violated to receive recognition by an international body that he was
wronged by the state. If the system was widely regarded as a failure, the
rates of interviewees wanting or recommending others to use it once again
would not be as high.

Conclusion
Even though the HRC is only a quasi-judicial institution, existing and
future international judicial institutions granting access to individuals can
learn several lessons from the problems of access to justice. The main lesson is that the international community cannot establish an institution and
simply assume that all who need a remedy can easily bring their case before
the institution. Rather, the relevant authorities should ensure that people
have information regarding the possibility of bringing a claim, focusing especially on countries with poor human rights records and vulnerable populations.
The international community should also be aware that, even if a state
agrees to come under the jurisdiction of the institution, it can at the same
time do things to discourage people from bringing communications against
it. Therefore, it should be considered in depth how the system can best deal
with such a conflict of interest. Another important lesson to be learned from
the HRC—and perhaps from the treaty bodies system in general—is that institutions should also be well-funded in order to have an accessible and fair
procedure and provide applicants with a timely remedy. Finally, cooperating
with civil society seems to be important on the international level, especially
when the institution itself is underfunded.
The current research might also shed some light on the relative success
of the European system. The European system is frequently regarded as a
success, and other regions attempt to copy the way that it operates. However, as was suggested above, the success of the European regional system
might be attributed more to the characteristics of the member states of the
European Convention than to the ways in which the regional human rights
system operates. Therefore, when designing an international institution
granting individual access, it is important to understand that it is counterproductive to simply “copy” a successful institution without being aware of
320
the regional particularities.

320.
For a discussion about transplanting legal institutions and the need to adopt them to
the local particularities, see Karen J. Alter et al., Transplanting the European Court of Justice:
The Experience of the Andean Tribunal of Justice, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 629, 660–64 (2012).
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As was discussed at the beginning, the idea that individuals are granted
access to international institutions was celebrated as a big step in international human rights law, and rightfully so. The history of human rights
shows clearly that the existence of a right is not enough; it also needs a system of implementation. The international community should now take one
step further and realize that a mere theoretical right to access the institution
is not enough. Actual steps need to be taken in order increase access to justice at the HRC.

Access to Justice

Fall 2018]

513

Appendix 1—Table of Variables and Sources
Variable
Number

Population

Delta year

GDP

Description
Number of communications
against a country-dependent
variable
Population of a country

Source
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/
statisticalsurvey.xls
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Excel-Data/
population.htm

Number of years from the
year that the state was a party to the Optional Protocol
from 1997

UN Website

GDP per capita in the country

IMF website:

https://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV5&chapter=4&lang=en

http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm
rECtHR

yearECtHR

Is the respondent country a
party to the European Convention on human rights at
the relevant year?
In what year did the country
join the ECtHR?

Council of Europe Website:
http://hub.coe.int/
Council of Europe Website:
http://hub.coe.int/

rInterAmer

yearInterAmer

rAfrican

yearAfrican

Alternative

Has the country granted jurisdiction to the InterAmerican Commission of
Human Rights at the relevant year?
In what year did the country
join grant Jurisdiction to the
Inter-American court?

OAS Website:

Is the State party to the African Commission of Human
Rights at the relevant year?

ACHPR:

When did the country grant
jurisdiction to the African
Court of Human Rights?

ACHPR:

Could the communication
have been brought to the
European Court of Human
Rights, the Inter-American
Commission of Human

Author

http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/
Basic4.Amer.Conv.Ratif.htm
OAS Website:
http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/
Basic4.Amer.Conv.Ratif.htm

http://www.african-court.org/en/images/
documents/Court/
Ratification_and_Deposit_of_the_Declaration.pdf

http://www.african-court.org/en/images/
documents/Court/
Ratification_and_Deposit_of_the_Declaration.pdf

514

Literacy

Rule of Law

Independence

Speech

Michigan Journal of International Law
Rights, or the African
Commission of Human
Rights?
What was the average literacy rate of the population for
1997–2013?
When the data was not
available for all the years,
the average was taken from
the years with the data
available.

[Vol. 39:453

UNESCO:
http://tellmaps.com/uis/literacy/
For countries without UNESCO annual information: http://world.bymap.org/
LiteracyRates.html (rely on CIA country description).

What is the rule of law rate
in the country?
x For the years 1997,
1999 and 2001 the
estimate is the year
before and the year
after.

World Bank:

What was the independence
of judiciary score of the
country?

CIRI:

What was the freedom of
speech score of the country?

CIRI:

http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/
index.aspx#home

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BxDpF6GQ6fbY25CYVRIOTJ2MHM/edit

http://www.humanrightsdata.com/p/datadocumentation.html
Polity

What is the polity2 score of
the respondent country?

Polity IV project:
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html

Human Rights

What is the latent mean
score of the respondent
country?

Latent Human Rights Protection Scores Version 2:
http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/
HumanRightsScores/faces/study/
StudyPage.xhtml?globalId=doi:10.7910/
DVN/24872
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Appendix 2—Number of Communications against Countries
Included in the Dataset
Name of State
Spain
Belarus
Canada
Australia
Czech Republic
Russia
Uzbekistan
Netherlands
France
Algeria
Tajikistan
Sri Lanka
Germany
Austria
Philippines
New Zealand
Colombia
Kyrgyzstan
Libya
Jamaica
Greece
Trinidad and Tobago
Guyana
South Korea*
Ukraine
Zambia
Peru
Belgium
Portugal
Cameroon
Denmark
Finland
Nepal
Sweden
Argentina
Cyprus
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Estonia
Ireland
Lithuania
Norway
Poland

Number of Communications
92
54
51
44
42
38
35
32
31
23
21
18
17
16
15
14
13
13
12
11
9
9
8
8
8
8
7
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
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Slovakia
Turkmenistan
Bulgaria
Chile
Latvia
Paraguay
Serbia and Montenegro
Uruguay
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Hungary
Iceland
Italy
Ivory Coast
Mauritius
Namibia
Romania
South Africa
Venezuela
Angola
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Burkina Faso
Central African Republic
Costa Rica
Croatia
Equatorial Guinea
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Mexico
Sierra Leone
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Togo
Turkey
Albania
Andorra
Barbados
Benin
Bolivia
Brazil
Cabo Verde
Chad
Congo
Djibouti
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Gambia
Ghana
Guatemala

[Vol. 39:453

4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Guinea
Honduras
Lesotho
Liechtenstein
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Malawi
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Nicaragua
Niger
Panama
Republic of Moldova
San Marino
Senegal
Seychelles
Slovenia
Somalia
Suriname
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Tunisia
Uganda

517
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

* I coded communications Jung et al. (1593-1603/2007) CCPR/C/98/D/
1593-1603/2007 (Apr. 30, 2010) as one communication, and Communications Min-Kyu Jeong et al. (1642-1741/2007) CCPR/C/101/D/1642-1741/
2007 (Apr. 27, 2011) as one communication. Each of those sets of communications was filed by the same representatives and on the same subject
(conscientious objection), and therefore the HRC chose to unite them. Since
these communications would usually have been filed as one unit, counting
each of them separately would have created bias in the quantitative data.
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Appendix 3—Negative Binomial Regressions by Regions
a. Africa
(1)

Independence

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

-0.00112
(0.394)

Polity

-0.0977
(0.0639)

Speech

-1.258**
(0.495)

Human
Rights

-0.367
(0.316)

Rule of Law

0.236
(0.352)

GDP (log)

0.977***
(0.240)

Literacy

0.0565***
(0.0151)

Alternative

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Population
(log)

0.561**

0.593*

0.551**

0.437

0.605**

0.821***

0.757***

(0.276)

(0.332)

(0.239)

(0.332)

(0.296)

(0.157)

(0.210)

Delta year

-0.0517

-0.0440

-0.0940**

-0.0333

-0.0588

-0.157***

-0.0870**

(0.0355)

(0.0479)

(0.0382)

(0.0532)

(0.0461)

(0.0362)

(0.0395)

Constant

-10.63**

-11.11**

-9.477***

-8.881*

-11.13**

-21.63***

-17.31***

(4.557)

(5.292)

(3.619)

(5.140)

(4.459)

(3.757)

(3.990)

465

427

465

489

489

457

489

Observations
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b. Asia
(1)
Independence

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

0.0111
(0.217)

Polity

-0.0215
(0.0329)

Speech

-0.224
(0.275)

Human Rights

-0.130
(0.259)

Rule of Law

-0.443*
(0.235)

GDP (log)

-0.353*
(0.202)

Literacy

0.0254***
(0.00722)

Alternative

Population (log)

Delta year

Constant

Observations

-1.151***

-1.109**

-0.927*

-1.076***

-0.414

-0.381

-1.105***

(0.360)

(0.443)

(0.483)

(0.390)

(0.618)

(0.567)

(0.376)

0.140

0.0629

0.149

0.0904

0.216

0.182

0.199

(0.139)

(0.150)

(0.143)

(0.173)

(0.136)

(0.131)

(0.157)

-0.103**

-0.0845**

-0.107***

-0.103***

-0.110***

-0.0791**

-0.0940**

(0.0449)

(0.0370)

(0.0414)

(0.0394)

(0.0364)

(0.0330)

(0.0418)

-1.700

-0.508

-1.680

-0.909

-3.212

0.207

-5.126*

(2.362)

(2.479)

(2.440)

(2.928)

(2.381)

(1.990)

(2.885)

159

151

159

159

159

159

159
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c. Eastern Europe
(1)
Independence

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

-0.120
(0.295)

Polity

0.0594
(0.0809)

Speech

-0.323
(0.359)

Human
Rights

0.593
(0.475)

Rule of Law

0.807
(0.580)

GDP (log)

1.208**
(0.501)

Literacy

Alternative

0.147
(0.229)
-1.606***

-2.322***

-2.656***

-2.368***

(0.662)

(0.939)

(0.500)

(0.493)

(0.715)

(0.448)

(0.619)

Population
(log)

0.637***

0.686***

0.577***

0.994***

0.872***

0.711***

0.645***

(0.113)

(0.131)

(0.147)

(0.353)

(0.220)

(0.104)

(0.116)

Delta year

-0.0459

-0.0421*

-0.0497*

-0.0430*

-0.0343

-0.105***

-0.0323

(0.0300)

(0.0237)

(0.0231)

Constant

Observations

-1.780*** -2.798***

-8.934*** -9.329***

-1.567**

(0.0267)

(0.0245)

(0.0254)

(0.0294)

-7.911***

-14.89***

-12.15***

-20.62***

-24.11

(1.971)

(1.994)

(2.571)

(5.677)

(3.064)

(4.548)

(22.72)

306

300

306

310

322

319

322
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d. Latin America
(1)
Independence

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

0.179
(0.436)

Polity

0.0167
(0.0805)

Speech

0.470
(0.354)

Human
Rights

-0.117
(0.289)

Rule of Law

0.0575
(0.282)

Literacy

0.0236
(0.0451)

Alternative

15.70***

14.43***

15.04***

15.68***

15.65***

15.66***

14.17***

(1.091)

(1.067)

(1.084)

(1.062)

(1.081)

(1.066)

(1.160)

0.269*

0.130

0.255**

0.177

0.249*

0.239*

0.241*

(0.140)

(0.169)

(0.129)

(0.148)

(0.137)

(0.131)

(0.136)

Delta year

0.177***
(0.0568)

0.170***
(0.0508)

0.170***
(0.0495)

-0.180***

-0.187***

-0.187***

-0.193***

(0.0577)

(0.0549)

(0.0550)

(0.0551)

Constant

20.54***
(2.578)

16.98***
(2.899)

20.16***
(2.282)

-18.81***

-19.89***

-19.77***

-20.43***

(2.548)

(2.306)

(2.268)

(4.317)

313

280

313

313

313

313

313

Population
(log)

Observations

Michigan Journal of International Law

522

[Vol. 39:453

e. Western
(1)
Independence

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

0.492
(1.053)

Polity

0.457
(0.518)

Speech

0.275
(0.310)

Human
Rights

-0.137
(0.301)

Rule of Law

0.576
(0.679)

GDP (log)

0.281
(0.661)

Literacy

-0.0127
(0.0896)
-0.895***

-0.872***

-0.891***

-0.963***

-0.744***

-0.906***

(0.251)

(0.285)

(0.267)

(0.263)

(0.279)

(0.252)

(0.253)

Population
(log)

0.757***

0.794***

0.768***

0.683***

0.826***

0.743***

0.756***

(0.176)

(0.251)

(0.180)

(0.192)

(0.190)

(0.183)

(0.178)

Delta year

-0.105***

-0.107***

-0.0985***

-0.112***

-0.110***

-0.122***

-0.112***

(0.0224)

(0.0209)

(0.0216)

(0.0221)

(0.0210)

(0.0278)

(0.0221)

Constant

-12.02***

-16.21*

-11.72***

-9.461***

-13.17***

-13.59**

-9.721

(3.372)

(9.117)

(3.263)

(3.594)

(3.462)

(6.084)

(8.871)

355

286

356

356

356

315

356

Alternative

Observations

-0.933***
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Appendix 4—Negative Binomial Regressions by Time Frames
Time 1 (1997–2002)
(1)
Independence

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

1.059***
(0.279)

Polity

0.0894***
(0.0297)

Speech

0.667***
(0.234)

Human
Rights

0.348***
(0.0815)

Rule of Law

0.524***
(0.118)

GDP (log)

0.557***
(0.116)

Literacy

0.0441**
*
(0.00979)

Alternative

-1.131***
(0.369)

(0.353)

(0.341)

(0.338)

(0.339)

(0.307)

(0.345)

Population
(log)

0.388***

0.346**

0.384***

0.497***

0.393***

0.387***

0.387***

(0.120)

(0.149)

(0.117)

(0.147)

(0.124)

(0.127)

(0.117)

Delta year

-0.0496

-0.0525

-0.0412

-0.0622

-0.0749

-0.0569

-0.0685

(0.0856)

(0.0893)

(0.0852)

(0.0967)

(0.0985)

(0.101)

(0.0980)

Constant

-7.415***

-5.703**

-6.791***

-8.270***

-6.367***

-11.02***

(2.315)

(2.580)

(2.108)

(2.608)

(2.185)

(2.769)

10.48***
(2.590)

453

411

453

470

471

440

471

Observations

-1.114***

-1.000***

-0.651*

-0.742**

-0.897***

-0.326
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Time 2 (2002–2007)
(1)
Independence

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

0.328*
(0.182)

Polity

0.0257
(0.0255)

Speech

0.140
(0.224)

Human
Rights

0.344***
(0.111)

Rule of Law

0.425***
(0.139)

GDP (log)

0.528***
(0.133)

Literacy

0.0517***
(0.0122)

Alternative

Population
(log)
Delta year

Constant

Observations

-1.571***

-1.547***

-1.449***

-1.591***

-1.672***

-1.785***

(0.338)

(0.330)

(0.304)

(0.322)

(0.370)

(0.363)

-1.030***
(0.290)

0.655***

0.664***

0.685***

0.828***

0.679***

0.621***

0.662***

(0.115)

(0.138)

(0.136)

(0.158)

(0.120)

(0.109)

(0.120)

0.121

0.101

0.108

0.0848

0.0989

0.0512

0.0783

(0.0987)

(0.0933)

(0.0946)

(0.0876)

(0.0882)

(0.0829)

(0.0837)

-11.11***

-10.86***

-11.35***

-13.55***

-10.92***

-14.24***

-15.68***

(2.036)

(2.183)

(2.403)

(2.636)

(1.971)

(2.508)

(2.536)

504

454

504

509

514

493

514
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Time 3 (2007–2012)
(1)
Independence

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

0.0874
(0.212)

Polity

-0.0409
(0.0365)

Speech

-0.269
(0.278)

Human
Rights

0.232*
(0.132)

Rule of
Law

0.239*
(0.145)

GDP (log)

0.575***
(0.114)

Literacy

0.0297***
(0.00919)
-1.541***

-1.286***

(0.510)

(0.430)

(0.454)

(0.523)

(0.546)

(0.483)

(0.454)

Population
(log)

0.625***

0.632***

0.607***

0.706***

0.628***

0.585***

0.630***

(0.110)

(0.125)

(0.113)

(0.134)

(0.113)

(0.108)

(0.110)

Delta year

-0.739***

-0.760***

-0.743***

-0.735***

-0.736***

-0.755***

-0.747***

(0.0884)

(0.0940)

(0.0909)

(0.0840)

(0.0834)

(0.0820)

(0.0861)

-1.950

-1.662

-1.371

-3.396

-1.913

-6.305***

-4.688**

(2.159)

(2.109)

(2.109)

(2.576)

(2.132)

(1.965)

(1.893)

641

579

642

648

654

624

654

Observations

-1.413***

-1.574***

-1.488***

Constant

-1.343***

-1.562***

Alternative
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Appendix 5 321
1.

I am a:
a. NGO employee.
b. Private Lawyer.
c. Other.

2.

How did you learn about the possibility of filing a communication to the
Human Rights Committee (HRC)?
a. Legal education.
b. Knew someone who filed a communication.
c. Internet.
d. A lawyer informed me of the possibility.
e. NGO informed of the possibility.
f. Other ______________.

3.

Do you think that the domestic courts were impartial in hearing your client’s case before you chose to refer it to the HRC?
a. Yes.
b. No.

4.

Did your client exhaust all possible domestic remedies before filing a
communication to the HRC?
a. Yes.
b. No. Why? _________.

5.

Did the state argue that the communication should not be heard by the
HRC because domestic remedies had not been exhausted?
a. Yes.
b. No.

6.

What was the primary reason for choosing to file a communication to the
HRC?

321.
This is the questionnaire for the representatives. The questionnaire for the applicants themselves was similar, but for reasons of relevance omitted questions 13, 14, 15, 22,
38, 40, 42.
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a. I/ the applicant believed that the state would implement the decision of
the HRC.
b. I/ the applicant wanted to bring the human rights violation to international attention.
c. Both a. and b.
d. Other: ___________.
7.

Did you believe that the state would implement the decision of the HRC?
a. Yes.
b. No.

8.

Do you believe that an alternative international human rights tribunal existed for the claim?
a. Yes.
b. No.

9.

If you believed that alternative international tribunal existed, which tribunal was that?
a. European Court of Human Rights.
b. Inter-American Commission/ Court on Human Rights.
c. African Commission/ Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
d. Other __________________.

10. If you believed that an alternative international tribunal existed, what was
the primary reason for choosing the HRC for filing the communication?
a. I thought that it would be more efficient.
b. It was easier to file a communication.
c. It was cheaper to file a communication.
d. Other: __________.
11. How did you connect with the applicant?
12. Did you reach out to the applicant or did the applicant reach out to you?
13. Have you previously filed communications to the HRC?
a. Yes.
b. No.
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14. If you have filed communications before, what were the circumstances and
against which state/ states were they filed? _____________.
15. Have you helped applicants with filing a communication without being officially listed as the representor in the case?
16. Have you ever heard of the HRC before deciding to file a communication
against the state?
a. Yes.
b. No.
17. Did you have a chance to interact with other people or professionals who
filed communications against their states before filing a communication
yourself?
a. Yes.
b. No.
18. Please provide more information about your interactions with other applicants: ______________.
19. Were you paid in order to help the applicant to file the communication?
a. Yes, the applicant paid.
b. Yes, someone else paid. Who? ____________
c. No, pro bono.
d. Other:___________.
20. How much money do you estimate that filing the communication cost?
How much hours did it take you to work on the communication? ______
21. Was the applicant afraid of any harassment/ persecution by the state following the filing of the communication?
a. Yes.
b. No.
22. Were you, as the representative, afraid of any harassment/ persecution by
the state following the filing of the communication?
a. Yes. In which way? _______.
b. No.
23. If you or the applicant were afraid of harassment/ persecution, why were
you afraid? ___________.
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24. Did you or the applicant actually feel any harassment/ persecution by the
state following the filing of the communication?
a. Yes: _____________.
b. No.
25. In which way were you/ the applicant harassed/ persecuted? ___________.
26. Did you file the communication on the United Nations website or by regular mail?
a. Email.
b. Mail.
c. Other.
27. What were the main difficulties that you encountered with filing a communication to the HRC? ____________.
28. At the time of filing the communication, were you aware of the implementation rate of the decisions of the HRC by the states?
a. Yes.
b. No.
29. What was the decision of the HRC in your communication?
a. Inadmissible.
b. Admissible.
c. No violation.
d. Violation.
30. What remedy, if at all, did the HRC indicate? _____________.
31. Do you think that the decision of the HRC specified detailed enough remedies?
a. Yes.
b. No. Explain: ____________.
32. What did you think about the process before the HRC? ___________.
33. Did the secretariat keep you updated regarding the progress of your communication?
a. Yes.
b. No.
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34. Do you think that the process before the HRC was fair?
a. Yes.
b. No. Why? ________________.
35. Was the decision in your case implemented by the state?
a. Yes. How? _____________.
b. No.
c. Partially. How? ______________.
36. Did your client have to undergo an additional judicial/ administrative procedure in the national courts in order for the HRC decision to be implemented by the state?
a. Yes. Which procedure? _____________.
b. No.
37. Do you think that the decision of the HRC had an impact beyond your specific case?
a. Yes. How? _________.
b. No. Why? __________.
38. On a scale of 1 to 5, how important was it for you that the state would implement the communication? (1 not important, 5 important).
39. On a scale of 1 to 5, how important was it for the applicant that the state
would implement the communication? (1 not important, 5 important).
40. On a scale of 1 to 5, how important was it for you that the national/ international public would be aware of the fact that you filed a communication
against the state? (1 not important, 5 important).
41. On a scale of 1 to 5, how important was it for the applicant that the national/ international public would be aware of the fact that you filed a communication against the state? (1 not important, 5 important).
42. On a scale of 1 to 5, how important was it for you that the national/ international public would be aware of the decision of the HRC in the communication? (1 not important, 5 important).
43. On a scale of 1 to 5, how important was it for the applicant that the national/ international public would be aware of the decision of the HRC in the
communication? (1 not important, 5 important).
44. Did you encourage/ are you planning to encourage other people to file
communications to the HRC and why?

Fall 2018]

Access to Justice

a. Yes: ____________.
b. No: ____________.
45. What can be improved in order to make the process more accessible?
______________.
46. Would you consider filing another communication to the Human Rights
Committee?
a. Yes: ___________.
b. No: ______________.
47. On a scale of 1 to 5, how satisfied are you from the process before the
HRC? (1 not satisfied, 5 satisfied).
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